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Comparing micro-evidence on rent sharing
from three di¤erent approaches
Sabien DOBBELAEREy Jacques MAIRESSEz
June, 2015
Abstract
Empirical labor economists have resorted to estimating the responsiveness of workerswages on rms
ability to pay to assess the extent to which employers share rents with their employees. This paper
compares this labor economics approach with two other approaches that rely on standard micro production
data only: the productivity approach for which estimates of the output elasticities of labor and materials
and data on the respective revenue shares are needed and the accounting approach which boils down
to directly computing the extent of rent sharing from rm accounting information. Using matched
employer-employee data on 60,294 employees working in 9,849 rms over the period 1984-2001 in France,
we quantify industry di¤erences in rent-sharing parameters derived from the three approaches. We nd
a median absolute extent of rent sharing of about 0.30 using either the productivity or the accounting
approach. Only exploiting rm-level information brings this median rent-sharing parameter down to 0.16
using the labor economics approach. Controlling for unobserved worker ability further reduces the median
absolute extent of rent sharing to 0.08. Our analysis makes clear that the three di¤erent approaches face
important trade-o¤s. Hence, empirical economists interested in establishing that prots are shared should
select the appropriate approach based on the particular research question and on the data at hand.
JEL classication : C23, D21, J31, J51.
Keywords : Rent sharing, wage equation, production function, matched employer-employee data.
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1 Introduction
Contrary to the Walrasian (competitive) labor market model, collective bargaining models predict a positive
relationship between wages of comparable workers and the prots of their rms.1 Starting from this theoretical
conjecture, a multitude of empirical studies have examined the e¤ect of industry or rm performance on wages
using either industry or rm data and have tested the rent-sharing hypothesis (e.g. Katz and Summers, 1989,
Blanchower et al., 1996 and Estevao and Tevlin, 2003 for the US; Christodes and Oswald, 1992 and Abowd
and Lemieux, 1993 for Canada; Teal, 1996 for Ghana; Van Reenen, 1996 for the UK; Goos and Konings,
2001 and Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006 for Belgium; Blanchower et al., 1990, Holmlund and Zetterberg,
1991, Nickell et al., 1994 and Hildreth and Oswald, 1997 for a sample of European countries). These studies,
which are based on di¤erent identication strategies, show without exception that changes in industry or
rm protability feed through into long-run changes in wages. In general, the estimated elasticities between
wages and prots per employee range between 0.02 and 0.20, depending on the quality of the instruments
used to control for the endogeneity of prots. Following the seminal contribution of Abowd et al. (1999),
providing a statistical decomposition of individual wages into worker and rm e¤ects and focusing on the
private sector in France, and thanks to the availability of matched employer-employee datasets, more recent
studies account for non-random sorting of high-ability (and thus high-wage) workers into high-prot rms
(e.g. Margolis and Salvanes, 2001 for France and Norway; Bronars and Famulari, 2001 for the US; Arai, 2003
and Nekby, 2003 for Sweden; Kramarz, 2003 for France; Rycx and Tojerow, 2004 and Du Caju et al., 2011
for Belgium; Guertzgen, 2009 for Germany; Martins, 2009 for Portugal). Using matched employer-employee
data to control for unobserved worker abilities, these studies typically obtain smaller e¤ects of rmsability
to pay on individual wages (in the [0.01-0.04]-range) compared to studies based on rm-level data.
Although most empirical labor economists have provided evidence on rent sharing by testing the theoretical
conjecture that rms protability is an important determinant of workerswages, another set of studies
have relied on embedding the e¢ cient bargaining framework (McDonald and Solow, 1981) into standard
production function theory to recover rent-sharing parameters. Using only production data, they either
estimate a structural model with a full set of explicitly specied factor share equations and the production
function (Bughin, 1996 for Belgium; Dumont et al., 2006 for a sample of European countries) or extend the
original Hall (1988) framework for estimating price-cost margins and estimate a reduced-form total factor
productivity equation (Crépon, Desplatz and Mairesse, 1999, 2005 for France; Dobbelaere, 2004 and Abraham
et al., 2009 for Belgium; Boulhol et al., 2011 for the UK). Depending on the estimation strategy, these studies
nd estimated absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters ranging between 0.10 and 0.60.
The aforementioned evidence on rent sharing stems from one particular empirical approach chosen by the
researcher. Our contribution to the empirical collective bargaining literature is to paint a richer picture
of rent sharing by examining how the extent of rent sharing is conditioned by the chosen approach. More
specically, this paper provides micro-evidence on rent sharing from orthogonal directions by exploiting
di¤erent dimensions in the same data, a matched employer-employee dataset, covering 103,995 employees
1Similar predictions are derived from a competitive labor market model with temporary frictions and positively sloped labor
supply schedules, an e¢ ciency wage model in which rms use higher wages as an incentive to improve employees e¤ort or a
labor contract model in which workers and rms are risk-sharing (see e.g. Blanchower et al., 1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997).
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working in 14,921 rms belonging to 52 manufacturing industries over the period 1984-2001 in France. Our
analysis serves the purpose of quantifying industry di¤erences in rent-sharing parameters derived from three
approaches that di¤er in terms of data requirements and modeling assumptions.
The rst approach, developed in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013), uses econometric production functions
as a tool for testing the competitiveness of labor and product markets and for assessing their degree of
imperfection.2 This approach, to which we refer as the productivity approach, only exploits the rm-level panel
and requires data on production values, factor inputs and factor costs. It is based on the gap methodology
which essentially starts from the observation that any factors that create misallocation of resources can
be thought of as generating wedges in the rst-order conditions of rm optimization problems. As such,
di¤erences between the estimated industry-specic output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue
shares are key to classifying industries in regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product
and labor markets. Considering two product market settings (perfect competition (PC) and imperfect
competition (IC)) and three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (PR),
Nickell and Andrews, 1983, e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and monopsony (MO), Manning, 2003), we distinguish
six regimes.
We dene both the labor market and the product market at the level of the 2-digit industry classication.
The industry classication for product markets is rather straightforward. The operational denition of the
labor market is motivated by the fact that France is characterized by industry-based unionism, justifying
an analysis at the industry level. An additional reason for the selection of France is that the government
often extends the terms of industry-level bargaining agreements to all employers, implying that collective
bargaining coverage is very high (around 95%), making a rent-sharing analysis particularly relevant.
Taken the productivity approach as our benchmark, we select the 25 out of the 52 industries that are
characterized by imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market.
For these IC-EB-industries, we derive industry-specic estimates of extent of rent-sharing parameters and
compare those with rent-sharing parameters obtained from the two other approaches, referred to as the labor
economics approach and the accounting approach. From a conceptual point of view, these two approaches
share a common feature. They are compatible with worker-rm negotiations that di¤er in terms of bargaining
scope. Bargaining issues might involve only wages, in which case the rm retains the right to determine
employment unilaterally (right-to-manage bargaining), wages and employment (e¢ cient bargaining) or wages
and working practices (labor hoarding, Haskel and Martin, 1992). However, they di¤er in terms of data
requirements: similar to the productivity approach, the accounting approach only uses the rm-level panel
whereas the labor economics approach exploits the worker-rm panel. In the labor economics approach, we
estimate a wage equation taking into account unobserved worker and rm heterogeneity. From the estimated
industry-specic wage-prot elasticities, we retrieve industry-specic rent-sharing parameters. Under the
assumption of constant returns-to-scale and a particular measurement of the workersalternative wage, we
compute directly industry-specic measures of rent sharing from rm accounting information on production
values, variable factor inputs and variable factor costs in the accounting approach.
2This approach has been implemented in three comparative studies: one using rm-level data for Belgium and the Netherlands
(Dobbelaere and Vancauteren, 2014), one using rm-level data for France, Japan and the Netherlands (Dobbelaere et al., 2015a)
and another using rm-level data for Chile and France (Dobbelaere et al., 2015b).
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Irrespective of the approach, we nd sizeable di¤erences in the absolute extent of rent sharing across the 25
IC-EB-industries with the degree of dispersion lying in the [0.10-0.20]-range. Based on the rm-level panel
dimension only, the median absolute extent of rent sharing amounts to 0.29 according to the productivity
approach and 0.32 according to the accounting approach. Only exploiting rm-level information brings the
median absolute extent of rent sharing down to 0.16 using the labor economics approach. Controlling for un-
observed worker ability thereby considering the possibility that high-ability workers might be systematically
sorted into high-prot rmsfurther reduces the median absolute extent of rent sharing to 0.08. Converting
the rent-sharing parameters obtained from the productivity and the accounting approach into wage-prot
elasticities shows that the median values of wage-prot elasticities lie in the [0.035-0.30]-range. The median
wage-prot elasticities derived from the productivity or the accounting approach are 6 to 8 times higher than
the ones derived from the labor economics approach. These di¤erences across the three approaches can be
attributable to di¤erences in the sources of identication of the rent-sharing parameters and to di¤erences
in modeling assumptions about the underlying labor bargaining setting and the nature of competition in
the product market. Hence, our analysis clearly shows that the three approaches face important trade-o¤s.
Empirical economists interested in quantifying the impact of protability conditions on wages should thus
carefully select the appropriate approach based on the particular research question and on the data at hand.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the productivity approach. Section 3 presents the labor economics
approach. Section 4 focuses on the accounting approach. Section 5 compares industry di¤erences in rent-
sharing parameters across the three approaches. Section 6 concludes.
2 Productivity approach
2.1 Theoretical framework
This section discusses, what we call, the productivity approach to recovering the extent of rent sharing.
In contrast to the most popular approach in empirical labor economics which relies on a wage equation
estimation, this approach requires standard production data while allowing for three distinct labor market
settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony). Essentially,
this approach nests the canonical rent-sharing models and the monopsony model in the seminal framework of
Hall (1988) for estimating price-cost margins and scale economies. These imperfectly competitive models of
wage determination are both intuitively appealing and tractable and can be viewed as representing two polar
extremes: rent-sharing models allocate market power to employees through costs of ring, hiring and training
while the monopsony model allocates market power to employers through search frictions or heterogeneous
worker preferences for job characteristics which generate upward sloping labor supply curves to individual
rms (Booth, 2014). We present the main ingredients of the theoretical framework. For technical details, we
refer to Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013).
We start from a production function Qit = itF (Nit; Mit; Kit), where i is a rm index, t a time index, N is
labor, M is material input and K is capital. it = Aei+ut+it , with i an unobserved rm-specic e¤ect, ut
a year-specic intercept and it a random component, is an index of technical change or truetotal factor
productivity. Denoting the logarithm of Qit; Nit; Mit; Kit and it by qit; nit; mit; kit and it respectively,
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the logarithmic specication of the production function gives:
qit = ("
Q
N )itnit + ("
Q
M )itmit + ("
Q
K)itkit + it (1)
where ("QJ )it (J = N; M; K) is the elasticity of output with respect to input factor J .
Firms operate under imperfect competition in the product market (IC). We allow for three labor mar-
ket settings (LMS): perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (PR)3 , e¢ cient bargaining (EB)
and monopsony (MO). We assume that material input and labor are variable factors. Short-run prot
maximization implies the following rst-order condition with respect to material input:
("QM )it = it (M )it (2)
where (M )it =
jitMit
PitQit
is the share of material costs in total revenue and it =
Pit
(CQ)it
refers to the mark-up of
output price Pit over marginal cost (CQ)it. Depending on the prevalent LMS, short-run prot maximization
implies the following rst-order condition with respect to labor:
("QN )it = it (N )it if LMS = PR (3)
= it (N )it   itit [1  (N )it   (M )it] if LMS = EB (4)
=
it (N )it
it
if LMS = MO (5)
where (N )it = witNitPitQit is the share of labor costs in total revenue. it =
it
1 it represents the relative extent
of rent sharing, it 2 [0; 1] the absolute extent of rent sharing, it = ("
N
w )it
1+("Nw )it
and ("Nw )it 2 <+ the wage
elasticity of the labor supply. From the rst-order conditions with respect to material input and labor, it
follows that the parameter of joint market imperfections ( it):
 it =
("QM )it
(M )it
  ("
Q
N )it
(N )it
(6)
= 0 if LMS = PR (7)
= itit

1  (N )it   (M )it
(N )it

> 0 if LMS = EB (8)
=  it
1
("Nw )it
< 0 if LMS = MO (9)
Assuming that the elasticity of scale, it = ("
Q
N )it + ("
Q
M )it + ("
Q
K)it, is known, the capital elasticity can be
expressed as:
("QK)it = it   ("QN )it   ("QM )it (10)
Inserting Eqs. (2), (6) and (10) in Eq. (1) and rearranging terms gives:
qit = it [(N )it (nit   kit) + (M )it (mit   kit)] +  it(N )it (kit   nit) + itkit + it (11)
3Our framework does not allow to disentangle perfect competition in the labor market from right-to-manage bargaining.
In both settings, labor is unilaterally determined by the rm from prot maximization, i.e. the wage rate equals the marginal
revenue of labor.
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2.2 Estimation method
We use econometric production functions as a tool for testing which type of product/labor market setting
prevails and for assessing the degree of market power in product and labor markets. Since we dene both the
product market and the labor market at the level of the 2-digit industry classication and our study aims
at comparing industry di¤erences in rent-sharing parameters across three di¤erent approaches, we estimate
average parameters. The empirical specication that acts as the bedrock for the regressions at the industry
level is hence given by:
qit =  [N (nit   kit) + M (mit   kit)] +  N (kit   nit) + ut + it (12)
with it = !it + it. Of the error components, !it represents unobserved productivity to the econometrician
but possibly observed by the rm at t when input decisions are made (transmitted productivity shock), while
it captures all other sources of error or productivity that is not observed by the rm before making input
choices at t. Our method of retrieving product and labor market imperfection parameters from the gap
between the estimated average output elasticities of labor and materials and their average revenue shares
allows to wash out rm-level di¤erences in adjustment costs which are temporary in nature, i.e. related to
the business cycle.
The most important methodological issues that emerge when estimating microeconomic production functions
are the simultaneity bias, omitted price bias, selection bias/endogeneity of attrition and measurement error.
We focus here on the rst one.4 The recent literature on production function estimation is dominated by two
econometric approaches that di¤er in handling endogeneity of inputs and unobserved productivity in models
linear in parameters. Intuitively, both approaches di¤er in the way they put assumptions on the economic
environment that allow econometricians to exploit lagged input decisions as instruments for current input
choices. The parametric generalized method of moments (GMM ) approach relies on instrumental variables.
The semiparametric structural control function approach uses observed variables and economic theory to
invert out productivity nonparametrically and hence to obtain an observable expression for productivity.
Since (i) we are primarily interested in retrieving consistent production function coe¢ cients rather than an
accurate measure of productivity and (ii) we prefer to implement the same estimation method in the labor
economics approach (see Section 3.2), we judge the parametric GMM approach to be the most appropriate.
In particular, we rely on a general approach to estimating error components models designed for panels with
few time periods and many individuals, covariates that are not strictly exogenous, unobserved heterogeneity,
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) (SYS-GMM estimator). This approach extends the standard (rst-di¤erenced) GMM
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) by relying on a richer set of orthogonal conditions.5 The error com-
ponents are an unobserved xed e¤ect (i), a possibly autoregressive productivity shock (!it = !it 1 + it
with jj < 1) and serially uncorrelated measurement errors (it), with it; it  i:i:d. Consistent with our
4We refer the reader to Van Beveren (2012) for a descriptive overview and to Dobbelaere et al. (2015a) for a discussion of
these issues.
5The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator assumes that the rst di¤erences of the instrumental variables are uncorrelated
with the xed e¤ects, which allows the introduction of more instruments which might improve e¢ ciency dramatically.
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static theoretical framework, we estimate the restricted version of the Blundell-Bond model and only consider
idiosyncratic productivity shocks (imposing  = 0).
We apply the two-step GMM estimator which is asymptotically more e¢ cient than the one-step GMM
estimator and which is robust to whatever patterns of heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation. We use a
nite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005). We build sets
of instruments following the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988)-approach which avoids the standard two-stage least
squares trade-o¤ between instrument lag depth and sample depth by including separate instruments for each
time period and substituting zeros for missing observations. To avoid instrument proliferation, we only use 2-
and 3-year lags of the instrumented variables as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation and the 1-year
lag of the rst-di¤erenced instrumented variables as instruments in the original equation. The validity of
GMM crucially hinges on the assumption that the instruments are exogenous. We report both the Sargan and
Hansen test statistics for the joint validity of the overidentifying restrictions.6 In addition to the Hansen test
evaluating the entire set of overidentifying restrictions/instruments, we provide di¤erence-in-Hansen statistics
to test the validity of subsets of instruments.
2.3 Data requirements: Firm-level panel
The key insight from the productivity approach is that industry-specic parameters of product and labor
market imperfections can be uncovered from production data with only information on production values,
usage of inputs and inputs costs, therefore only exploiting the rm-level panel. The rm accounting data
are sourced from EAE (Enquête Annuelle dEntreprise, Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles
(SESSI)). Our estimation period covers the years 1984-2001. Since our instrumentation strategy entails using
up to 3-year lags of input factors as instruments and we have rm accounting information prior to 1984, we
restrict our total sample to rms having at least four consecutive observations during the period 1981-2001.
After some trimming on rm input shares in total revenue, rm input growth rates, rm average wages and
rm accounting prots to eliminate outliers and anomalies in the total sample, our estimation sample consists
of an unbalanced panel of 14,921 rms covering the period 1984-2001. Table B.1 in Appendix B gives the
panel structure of the total sample (period 1981-2001) and the estimation sample (period 1984-2001).
Output is dened as current production deated by the two-digit producer price index.7 Labor (N) refers to
the average number of employees in each rm for each year. Material input (M) is dened as intermediate
6We opt to report both the Sargan and the Hansen statistics after the two-step estimations since the Sargan tests do not
depend on an estimate of the optimal weighting matrix and are hence not so vulnerable to instrument proliferation. On the
other hand, they require homoskedastic errors for consistency which is not likely to be the case. As documented by Andersen
and Sørensen (1996) and Bowsher (2002), instrument proliferation might weaken the Hansen test of instrument validity to the
point where it generates implausibly good p-values (see Roodman, 2009 for a discussion).
7As in many rm-level datasets, we observe rm-level revenues and not prices and quantities separately. The productivity
literature is dominated by two approaches to deal with this issue. One approach deates rm-level revenues by an industry-
level price index and thus estimates a revenue production function rather than an output production function. The other
approach follows Klette and Griliches (1996) which amounts to adding the growth in industry output as an additional regressor.
Theoretically, this approach relies on the assumption that the market power of rms originates from product di¤erentiation.
Intuitively, in the case of product di¤erentiation, the demand for an individual rms products is a function of its relative
price within the industry. Relative price di¤erences can then be expressed in terms of relative output growth di¤erences in the
industry. We follow the predominant approach in the literature and use the former.
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consumption deated by the two-digit intermediate consumption price index. The capital stock (K) is
measured by the gross bookvalue of xed assets. The shares of labor (N ) and material input (M ) are
constructed by dividing respectively the rm total labor cost and undeated intermediate consumption by
the rm undeated production and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent years.
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation and quartile values of our main variables needed for imple-
menting the productivity approach. The average growth rate of real rm output is 3:1% per year over the
period 1984-2001. Labor, materials and capital have increased at an average annual growth rate of 1:1%,
4:4% and 0:5% respectively. The median shares of labor and materials in total revenue amount to 0.29 and
0.52 respectively.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
As discussed above, we allow for heterogeneity of the production technology across rms by breaking the
estimation sample into 52 manufacturing industries, which are based on the French industrial classication
(Nomenclature économique de synthèse - Niveau 3[NES 114]). The fourth column of Table B.2 in Appendix
B presents the number of rms and the number of observations for each industry in the estimation sample
(minimum: 547 observations).
2.4 Identication of IC-EB-industries
For each industry I 2 f1; : : : ; 52g, we estimate the standard Cobb-Douglas production function [Eq. (12)]
using the SYS-GMM estimator.
Eq. (8) shows that the gap between the estimated output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue
shares are key to empirical identication of the product and labor market imperfection parameters. Intuitively,
in a perfectly competitive labor market or in a right-to-manage bargaining setting, the marginal employee
receives a wage that equals his/her marginal revenue. As such, the only source of discrepancy between the
estimated output elasticity of labor and the share of labor costs in revenue is the price-cost mark-up, just like
in the materials market, yielding the value zero of the joint market imperfections parameter. In an e¢ cient
bargaining setting, the marginal employee gets a wage that exceeds his/her marginal revenue since e¢ cient
bargaining allocates inframarginal gains across employees, yielding the positive value of the joint market
imperfections parameter. In a monopsony setting, on the other hand, the marginal employee obtains a wage
that is less than his/her marginal revenue, yielding the negative value of the joint market imperfections
parameter.
On pragmatic grounds, we consider that dening perfect competition in both product and labor markets as
respectively implying I = 1 and  I = 0 is too excessive. We have chosen I0 = 1:10 and j I0j= j0:10j
as reasonable threshold values. Our classication procedure is entirely based on the point estimates of the
price-cost mark-up I and the joint market imperfections parameter  I . For example, if our null hypothesis
is that imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market feature the
industry, we perform the following test: H10 : (I   1) > 0:10 and H20 :  I > 0:10. The test rejects that
the IC-EB-regime applies if either H10 or H20 is rejected. This procedure is summarized in Appendix A.
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Once the regime is determined, we are able to derive industry-specic estimates of price-cost mark-up (I)
and rent-sharing (I) parameters if the e¢ cient bargaining model prevails or price-cost mark-up and labor
supply elasticity (
 
"Nw

I
) parameters in case of the monopsony model (see Eq. (8) and (9), respectively).
Table B.3 in Appendix B presents the industry classication. For details on the specic industries belonging
to each regime, we refer to column 8 of Table B.2 in Appendix B. Given that rent sharing is more likely
to take place in industries where rents can be extracted, we select industries characterized by imperfect
competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (IC-EB) to compare average
industry-specic rent-sharing parameters derived from the three approaches. The IC-EB-regime is by far the
most predominant regime: 25 out of the 52 industries (48%) belong to this regime. The IC-EB-industries
contain 66% of the rms (9; 849 out of the 14; 921 rms) and represent 58% of total employment. They
include the clothing, leather goods, publishing, furniture, shipbuilding, aircraft, metal products, medical and
surgical equipment, paper products, rubber products and electronics industries. The lower part of Table
1 reveals a lower average growth rate of real rm output, labor and capital (of 2.6%, 0.9% and 0.3% per
year, respectively) in the IC-EB-sample compared to the estimation sample which includes all the prevalent
regimes.
2.5 Average rent-sharing parameters in IC-EB-industries
From Eq. (8), it follows that the productivity approach allows to identify average industry-specic relative
rent-sharing parameters by comparing the estimated average industry-specic production function coe¢ -
cients, i.e. the estimated average industry-specic output elasticities of labor and materials, with the average
industry-specic shares of labor and materials in revenue:
bI = (b"QN )I  
h
(b"QM )I (N )I(M )I i
(b"QM )I
(M )I
[(N )I + (M )I   1]
(13)
Average industry-specic absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters are calculated as bI = bI1+bI . The
standard errors of bI and bI are computed using the Delta Method (Wooldridge, 2002).8 Table 2 reports
di¤erent measures of rent sharing. The left part presents the average industry-specic relative and absolute
extent of rent-sharing parameters which are directly derived from the productivity approach, to which we refer
as prodI and 
prod
I respectively. The middle part reports the average industry-specic wage-prot elasticities
capturing the responsiveness of average rm wages to prots per employee. We consider two variants. The
rst variant is dened as follows:

"w
N
prod
I
= prodI  mean
 
^ 
w  N

it
!
(14)
where
^ 
wN

it
is the smoothed ratio of prots per employee to average rm wages, dened as 15
tP
k=t 4


wN

ik
8Dropping subscripts,
 
b2 =  MN+M 12
b"Q
M
2 
b"Q
N
!2
 2b"Q
N
b"Q
M
 
b"Q
N
;b"Q
M
!
+
b"Q
N
2 
b"Q
M
!2
b"Q
M
4 and b2 = (b)2(1+b)4 .
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if


wN

it 4
is not missing, otherwise equal to 14
tP
k=t 3


wN

ik
, and mean
 
^ 
wN

it
!
is the average of
this ratio in industry I. The motivation for using the smoothed ratio is that rm prots exhibit large
volatility.
Under the assumption that
^ 
wN

is lognormally distributed, i.e. y = ln
^ 
wN

is normally distributed
with mean y and standard deviation y, the second variant is dened as follows:
^
"w
N
prod
I
= prodI  ey+
(y)2
2 (15)
To assess the impact of prots on the wage distribution, Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing (Lester,
1952) is reported in the right part. Similar to the wage-prot elasticities, we dene the two variants as follows:
LprodI =

"w
N
prod
I
 4
sd
g  
N

it

mean
g  
N

it
 (16)
LprodI =
^
"w
N
prod
I
 4
sd
g  
N

it

mean
g  
N

it
 (17)
where g  N it is smoothed prots per employee, dened as 15 tP
k=t 4
 

N

ik
if
 

N

it 4 is not missing, otherwise
equal to 14
tP
k=t 3
 

N

ik
, and sd
g  
N

it

and mean
g  
N

it

are the standard deviation and the average of
smoothed prots per employee in industry I, respectively. Lesters range measures to which extent di¤erences
in prots per employee could explain di¤erences in wages and is based upon the idea that when the number
of observations is large 4 times the standard deviation is the approximate width of the 95% condence
interval for a future observation. Put di¤erently, this statistic indicates the extent to which wages would
increase if a worker were to move from a rm at the bottom of the prot distribution (two standard deviations
below the mean level of prots) to a rm at the top of the prot distribution (two standard deviations above
the mean) ceteris paribus.
In addition to the rent-sharing parameters reported in Table 2, Table B.5 in Appendix B also reports the
computed factor shares, output and scale elasticity estimates, joint market imperfections parameter and
price-cost mark-up, and the diagnostic tests. For reasons of completeness, Table B.5 also presents the
industry-specic SYS-GMM estimates of the industries which are classied in the 5 other regimes (PC-PR,
IC-PR, PC-EB, PC-MO and IC-MO). In Table B.5, industries within the PC-PR- and IC-PR-regimes
are ranked according to I . Within the PC-MO- and IC-MO-regimes, industries are ranked according
to
 
"Nw

I
. In Tables 2 and B.5, we rank industries within the IC-EB-regime in increasing order of prodI .
Focusing on the IC-EB-industries, the Sargan test statistic fails to conrm the joint validity of the moment
restrictions, which might be due to the existence of heteroscedasticity. In 5 out of the 25 IC-EB-industries
(ind. I = 6; 8; 11; 44; 48), the Hansen test also rejects the joint validity of the identifying restrictions. For
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industry I = 6; 11; 48, the di¤erence-in-Hansen tests reject the exogeneity of the 1-year lagged rst-di¤erenced
inputs as instruments in the levels equation.
Table 2 shows that the absolute extent of rent-sharing parameter (prodI ) is estimated to be lower than 0.22
for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.35 for the top quartile. The average and median values of
prodI are both estimated at 0.29. Since the two variants of both the wage-prot elasticity and Lesters range
of wages due to rent sharing are very similar, we focus the discussion on the rst variant. The wage-prot
elasticity is lower than 0.22 for industries in the rst quartile and higher than 0.34 for industries in the third
quartile. The average and median values of

"w
N
prod
I
amount to 0.28 and 0.25 respectively. This implies
that, on average, a doubling of prots per employee increases average rm wages by 28% ceteris paribus.
These large wage-prot elasticity estimates are close to the rm-level results of Abowd and Lemieux (1993),
Teal (1996), Van Reenen (1996), Estevao and Tevlin (2003) and the matched worker-rm results of Martins
(2009). These studies rely on, what we call, the labor economics approach to estimating rent sharing which
boils down to estimating a wage equation and control for endogeneity of (quasi-) rents by using exogenous
demand shifters as instruments.9 Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing is lower than 0.73 for the rst
quartile of industries and higher than 1.31 for the top quartile. The average and median values of L
prod
I
amount to 1.18 and 0.98 respectively. Hence, on average, it appears that the wage of a worker would increase
by 118% if she switched from a low-prot to a high-prot rm ceteris paribus.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
3 Labor Economics approach
3.1 Theoretical framework
This section discusses the labor economics approach to recovering the extent of rent sharing. Using a standard
Nash-bargaining setup, we present three bargaining models the canonical e¢ cient bargaining and right-to-
manage models and the labor hoarding modelwhich are characterized by a di¤erent bargaining scope and
which predict that workers will receive wages in excess of their best alternative, with this di¤erence depending
positively on their rmsprotability.
3.1.1 E¢ cient bargaining model
The e¢ cient bargaining (EB) model assumes that the workers and the rm negotiate simultaneously over
wages and employment in order to maximize the joint surplus of their economic activity. The bounds of
the bargaining range are given by the minimum acceptable utility levels for both parties. In the absence
of an agreement, both parties receive their fallback utility. It is the objective of the workers to maximize
U(wit; Nit) = Nitwit + (N it  Nit)wit, where N it is the competitive employment level (0 < Nit  N it) and
wit  wit the alternative wage. Consistent with capital quasi-xity, it is the rms objective to maximize
9 In particular, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) use prices of imports and exports, Teal (1996) exchange rate variation, Van
Reenen (1996) past technological innovations, Estevao and Tevlin (2003) demand shifters retrieved from input-output tables
and Martins (2009) interactions between the exchange rate and the share of exports.
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its short-run prot function: it = Rit   witNit   jitMit, where Rit = PitQit stands for total revenue and
Qit = itF (Nit; Mit; Kit). The revenue-shifting parameter (it) is a function of the production technology
and the demand for the nal good. In the absence of an agreement, the representative worker receives the
alternative wage. If no revenue accrues to the rm when bargaining breaks down, the rms short-run prot
equals zero in which case the rm has to bear only the xed costs of capital. Hence, the generalized Nash
product is written as:

EB =

Nitwit +
 
N it  Nit

wit  N itwit
	it fRit   witNit   jitMitg1 it (18)
Maximization of Eq. (18) with respect to the wage rate gives the following rst-order condition:
wit = wit + it

Rit   witNit   jitMit
Nit

(19)
= (1  it)wit + it

Rit   witNit   jitMit
Nit

Eq. (19) shows that wages are a weighted average of rmsability to pay, Rit witNit jitMitNit , and the workers
alternative market wage wit.
Maximization of Eq. (18) with respect to labor gives the following rst-order condition:
wit = (RN )it + it

Rit   (RN )itNit   jitMit
Nit

(20)
with (RN )it the marginal revenue of labor.
Solving simultaneously Eqs. (19) and (20) leads to the following expression for the contract curve:
(RN )it = wit (21)
Eq. (21) shows that under risk neutrality, the rms decision about employment equals the one of a (non-
bargaining) neoclassical rm that maximizes its short-run prot at the alternative wage. Put di¤erently, the
rm hires workers until the marginal revenue of labor is equal to the wage a worker would receive if red,
i.e. the employment level does not depend on the bargained wage.
3.1.2 Right-to-manage model
The right-to-manage (RTM) model postulates that the workers negotiate with the rm over wages while the
rm chooses its prot-maximizing employment level. The generalized Nash product to be maximized now
becomes:

RTM =

Nit(wit)wit +
 
N it  Nit(wit

wit  N itwit
	it fRit   witNit(wit)  jitMitg1 it (22)
where Nit(wit) represents the optimal employment level chosen by the rm given the level of the bargained
wage. This optimal level of employment is obtained from the solution to the rms prot maximization
problem:
(RN )it = wit (23)
Eq. (23) shows that employment is endogenous with respect to bargained wages.
Maximization of Eq. (22) with respect to the wage rate subject to Eq. (23) is equivalent to Eq. (19).
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3.1.3 Labor hoarding model
The labor hoarding (LH) model is based on two key assumptions. First, there exists overhead labor at
the rm, denoted by (NO)it, which can either be interpreted as a proportion of the workers time that is
paid for but unproductive to the rm due to e.g. illicit shirking, set-up of machinery or co¤ee breaks, or
the proportion of the workforce (rather than the hour) that is paid for but unproductive due to generous
crew sizes or overmanning. Second, workers value on-the-job leisure and their preferences are represented by
the following objective function: V (wit; (NO)it) = (wit   wit)

NO
NP

it
 

NO
NP

it

, with (NP )it productive
labor,

NO
NP

it
the degree of overmanning and

NO
NP

it
the alternative overhead labor ratio. The workers and
the rm negotiate simultaneously over wages and overhead labor while productive labor is unilaterally chosen
by the rm at the prot-maximizing level:
(RNP )it = wit (24)
with (RNP )it the marginal revenue of productive labor. Assuming that both types of labor are paid the same,
the generalized Nash product is now written as:

LH =
(
(wit   wit)
 
NO
NP

it
 

NO
NP

it
!)it
fRit wit((NO)it + (NP )it) jitMitg1 it (25)
Maximization of Eq. (25) with respect to the wage rate subject to Eq. (24) is equivalent to Eq. (19) with
Nit = (NO)it + (NP )it.
Maximization of Eq. (25) with respect to overhead labor gives the following rst-order condition:
it
 
NO
NP

it
 

NO
NP

it
! 1
1
(NP )it
=
(1  it)wit
Rit   witNit   jitMit (26)
Rearranging Eq. (26) and using the denition of Nit leads to the following expression for the overhead labor
ratio: 
NO
NP

it
= (1  it)

NO
NP

it
+ it

Rit   wit (NP )it   jitMit
wit (NP )it

(27)
3.2 Estimation method
Following standard practice in the collective bargaining literature, the statistical specication of the equi-
librium wage-prot relation that results from the bargaining process described above [Eq. (19)] is given
by:
lnwj(i)t = 0 + 1 lnwit + "
w

N
ln
 
N

it
+ 2 ln

K
L

it
+ j(i) + i + t + jt (28)
where wj(i)t are net nominal earnings of individual j working in rm i at date t. The alternative wage wit is
captured by the 5th percentile value of the worker wage distribution of the employing rm i at time t. it,
Nit and
 
K
L

it
are respectively the accounting prots, employment and capital intensity of rm i at time t.
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j(i) is the individual e¤ect, i the rm e¤ect, t year e¤ects and jt the statistical residual. Our parameter
of interest is "w
N
, the wage-prot elasticity.
From the previous section, it is clear that Eq. (19) is independent of the true nature of the employment
function. Since Eq. (28) is simply the empirically testable wage equation of this equilibrium wage-prot
relation that we estimate for each industry I, the rent-sharing parameter estimates that are derived from
the estimated wage-prot elasticities are compatible with worker-rm negotiations that di¤er in terms of
bargaining scope: either only wages (RTM model), wages and employment (EB model) or wages and
working practices (LH model). We follow most of the literature by estimating Eq. (19) in logs rather than in
levels (Martins, 2007). The motivation of estimating the wage equation in logs is essentially that bargaining
does not apply to negative prots. By taking the natural logarithm of our prots-per-worker variable, we
lose 7% of the observations in the sample.
The most important methodological issues that arise when identifying the impact of rm protability on
worker wages are the endogeneity of prots per employee, omitted variable bias and measurement error. The
endogeneity of prots is due to two sources of reverse causality. First, the wage-prot elasticity might be
underestimated due to the accounting relationship between wages and prots, implying that higher wages
lead to lower prots. Second, theories of incentive pay and e¢ ciency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984;
Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) predict that higher wages might lead to higher prots, which could generate an
upward bias in wage-prot elasticities. Omitted variables, correlated with the prot measure, might render
the rent-sharing coe¢ cients inconsistent. Wages might vary across rms due to di¤erences in rms skill
compositions, wage and employment policies, organization type, technological conditions or a set of unknown
factors. Not accounting for a systematic sorting of workers across rms might also bias the estimated wage-
prot relation. A variety of rm-specic measures of prots or productivity have been used in the literature
including accounting prots per employee, the rate of return on capital, quasi rents (prots adjusted by
alternative opportunity costs for labor and capital) per employee, Tobins q and Solow residuals. Each of
these variables are likely to be measured with error, potentially causing biased and inconsistent rent-sharing
estimates, particularly with di¤erenced data.
Consistent with the productivity approach, we deal with the endogeneity problem by applying the two-
step SYS-GMM estimator. A common instrumentation strategy in the literature is to use lagged values of
rm protability as instruments (see e.g. Blanchower et al., 1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). As data
limitations precluded us from using exogenous rm demand shifters as a source of variation of prots that
does not impact directly upon wages, we follow this common practice. In particular, we use the 2- and 3-year
lags of the smoothed prots-per-employee variable as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation and the
1-year lag of the rst-di¤erences smoothed prots-per-employee variable as instruments in the levels equation.
We evaluate both the entire set of instruments using the Sargan and Hansen test statistics and subsets of
instruments using di¤erence-in-Hansen statistics. Having repeated information on individuals, we control
for unobserved worker ability and rm xed e¤ects. We take into account di¤erences in rms labor skill
composition by including the capital intensity for each rm-year (Griliches, 1969; Bronars and Famulari, 2001
Du¤y et al., 2004). If capital and skilled labor are complements, capital-intensive rms will hire workers with
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greater observed and unobserved skills, implying that the wage-prot elasticity estimates might simply pick
up the impact of higher unobserved ability.10
We restricted the estimation of Eq. (28) to individuals working in the same rms across di¤erent years,
i.e. we exclude worker mobility. Our motivation is twofold. First, we are primarily interested in obtaining
consistent estimates of the wage-prot elasticity

"w
N

, rather than separately identifying individual and
rm-level unobserved heterogeneity
 
j(i) and i, respectively

themselves. Therefore, s = j(i) + i is
dened as the unobserved spell e¤ect for individual-rm spell s (Abowd et al., 1999; Andrews et al., 2006).
Second, although we have data for several years and for several individuals in the rm, we could have chosen
to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity as well as rm-level unobserved heterogeneity in a single
xed-e¤ects estimation. The problem is, however, that separate identication of both types of unobserved
heterogeneity relies on workers who move between employers. This identication strategy is only valid if
workersemployer switches are exogeneous and random, which is not likely to be the case (see Gibbons and
Katz, 1992) and impossible to verify without having information on the reason of mobility.
3.3 Data requirements: Matched worker-rm panel
Following the most recent stream of the empirical collective bargaining literature, we use matched employer-
employee information to recover industry-specic rent-sharing parameters using the labor economics ap-
proach. Our employer-employee data are drawn from the DADS (Déclarations Annuelles des Données
Sociales). The DADS is a large-scale administrative database collected by INSEE (Institut National de la
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) and maintained in the Division des Revenus. The data are based on
a mandatory employer report of the gross earnings of each employee subject to French payroll taxes. These
taxes apply to essentially all employed individuals in the economy. The Division des Revenus provides an
extract of the DADS for scientic purposes, covering all individuals employed in French enterprises who were
born in October of even-numbered years, excluding civil servants.
Our estimation sample is obtained by merging the rm current account and balance sheet data of the 14,921
rms covering the years 1984-2001 that we used in the productivity approach with the matched employer-
employee information. Because of the 1990 Census, however, we excluded the year 1990 from the DADS
database. For each observation, we have information on the exact starting date and end date of the job spell
in the rm and the full-time/part-time status of the worker. Each rm-worker-year observation additionally
includes information on the individuals sex, month, year and place of birth, current occupation and total
net nominal earnings during the year. Employer characteristics include the location and industry of the
employing rm. As motivated above, we only select individuals who remained at the same rm across
di¤erent years (labelled as stayers) for regression purposes.11 In addition, we restrict the estimation to
full-time stayers who worked 12 months a year for at least 2 years. After some trimming on net nominal
earnings to eliminate outliers and anomalies, our matched worker-rm estimation sample contains 648,889
observations, corresponding to 103,995 employees working in 14,921 rms covering the period 1984-2001. The
10From a theoretical perspective, the inclusion of capital-intensity might be motivated by the fact that it in the Nash product
[Eqs. (18), (22) or (25)] represents the average absolute extent of rent sharing across skill groups.
11Looking at the original sample of individuals who worked full-time, 12 months a year for at least 2 years, we observe that
91% of the individuals are non-movers, 5% of the individuals change employers once and 4% move twice between employers.
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sixth column of Table B.2 in Appendix B presents the number of workers and the number of observations for
each of the 52 industries (minimum: 1,468 observations). Table B.4 in Appendix B gives the panel structure
of the estimation sample.
Sorting rms by average number of workers and looking at the distribution of workers across rms, we observe
4 workers per rm for rms in the rst quartile, 10 workers per rm for rms in the second quartile and 26
workers per rm for rms in the third quartile. The number of observations per worker (rm) is 3 (8) for the
rst quartile of workers (rms), 5 (11) for the second quartile and 9 (14) for the third quartile.
Our empirical rent-sharing analysis is restricted to those industries that are characterized by imperfect
competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining the labor market according to the productivity
approach. The IC-EB-sample consists of 60,294 employees (58% of the estimation sample) working in 9,849
rms (66% of the estimation sample). Using the matched worker-rm panel, the wage
 
wj(i)t

refers to the
average net nominal wage per worker-year. In addition to dening the wage at the worker level, we compute
the rm average wage per worker directly from the rm accounting information as the wage bill divided by
the average number of employees in each rm for each year (wit). Our prots-per-employee variable
 

N

it
is drawn from the rm-level panel and is measured by value added minus labor costs divided by the average
number of employees in each rm for each year. Given the high volatility of rm protability, we use the
smoothed prots-per-employee variable g  N it as the main covariate in the wage regressions.12 In addition
to the variables discussed in Section 2.3, Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation and quartile values of 

N

it
, g  N it, wit, wj(i)t and Nj(i)t which is the number of workers observed in each rm-year based on the
matched worker-rm panel.
3.4 Average rent-sharing parameters in IC-EB-industries
The di¤erent measures of rent sharing for each of the 25 IC-EB-industries obtained from the labor economics
approach are presented in Table 3. We consider two sets of estimates. The rst set results from estimating
lnwj(i)t = 0+1 lnwit+ "
w

N
ln g  N it+2 ln  KL it+j(i)+i+t+ jt using the SYS-GMM estimator. In
these estimates, we control for interrm di¤erences in workersskills. We denote these rent-sharing estimates
by superscript lab,ww. The second set does not control for skill di¤erences across wage bargains and
estimates lnwit = 0 + 1 lnwit + "
w

N
ln g  N it + 2 ln  KL it + i + t + it using the SYS-GMM estimator.
In the second specication, we do not take into account that high-prot rms may pay higher wages because
they employ high-skilled workers, not because their wages are higher for workers of a given ability. We only
indirectly control for di¤erences in rmslabor composition through including capital intensity as a regressor.
We denote these rent-sharing estimates by superscript lab,fw. Comparing both sets of results gives insights
into the importance of this omitted variable problem.
For each set of results, the left part of Table 3 reports the average industry-specic wage-prot elasticity
estimates

"w
N
lab;ww=fw
I
and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing Llab;ww=fwI . The middle part
12This is consistent with using the smoothed ratio of prots per employee to average rm wages
 
^ 
wN

it
!
to recover
wage-prot elasticities from relative extent of rent-sharing parameters and using in turn smoothed prots per employee to recover
Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing from the wage-prot elasticities in the productivity approach.
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reports the average industry-specic relative extent of rent-sharing parameters. We consider two variants.
Focusing on the rst set of results, the rst variant is dened as follows:
lab;wwI =

"w
N
lab;ww
I
 mean
 
^w  N


it
!
(29)
where ^
 
wN


it
is the smoothed ratio of average rm wages to prots per employee, dened as 15
tP
k=t 4
 
wN


ik
if
 
wN


it 4 is not missing, otherwise equal to
1
4
tP
k=t 3
 
wN


ik
, and mean

^ wN


it

is the average of
this ratio in industry I. The motivation for using the smoothed ratio is evidence of high volatility in the rm
prots series (see supra).
Under the assumption that ^
 
wN


is lognormally distributed, i.e. z = ln ^
 
wN


is normally distributed
with mean z and standard deviation z, the second variant is dened as follows:
elab;wwI = "wN lab;wwI  ez+ (z)22 (30)
Using the labor economics approach, the identication of the industry-specic extent of rent-sharing pa-
rameter which are comparable to the productivity approach is hence driven by di¤erences between the
estimated industry-specic wage-prot elasticity and the industry-specic smoothed ratio of the wage bill to
total prots.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
In addition to the wage-prot elasticities reported in Table 3, Table B.6 in Appendix B also reports the
responsiveness of wages to the alternative wage or capital intensity, and the diagnostic tests. The industries
in Tables 3 and B.6 are ranked according to lab;wwI . For both sets of estimates, the Sargan test rejects the
null of exogeneity of the instruments in all industries. Focusing on the rst set of estimates, using ln(wj(i)t)
as the dependent variable, shows that the Hansen test rejects the joint validity of the moment conditions
in 23 out of the 25 industries.13 Focusing on the second set of estimates, using ln(wit) as the dependent
variable, reveals that the Hansen test only fails to conrm the joint validity of the identifying restrictions
in 3 out of the 25 industries (ind. I = 31; 33; 44). The di¤erence-in-Hansen tests suggest that the 1-year
lagged rst-di¤erenced smoothed prots per employee as instruments in the levels equation may be to blame
(exogeneity rejected).
Using individual worker wages, Table 3 reveals that wages do not seem to depend on rmsability to pay
"w
N
lab;ww
I

for the rst quartile of industries, whereas the wage-prot elasticity is estimated to be higher
13For 3 out of these 23 industries (ind. I = 34; 46; 52), the di¤erence-in-Hansen tests reject the exogeneity of the 1-year
lagged rst-di¤erenced smoothed prots-per-employee variable as instruments in the levels equation. The di¤erence-in-Hansen
tests additionally reject the validitiy of (i) the 2-year lags of the smoothed prots-per-employee variable as instruments in the
rst-di¤erenced equation for 2 industries (ind. I = 11; 49), (ii) the 3-year lags of the smoothed prots-peremployee variable as
instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation for 2 industries (ind. I = 39; 43) and (iii) the 2- and 3-year lags of the smoothed
prots-per-employee variable as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation for 7 industries (ind. I = 5; 8; 19; 26; 33; 44; 45). For
6 out of these 23 industries (ind. I = 6; 18; 21; 29; 47; 48), only the use of the 2- and 3-year lags of the smoothed prots-per-
employee variable as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation does not prove informative.
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than 0.049 for the top quartile . The average and median values of

"w
N
lab;ww
I
are estimated at 0.030 and
0.035 respectively, implying that on average a doubling of prots per employee increases individual worker
wages ceteris paribus by 3%. Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing is estimated to be lower than 0.1%
for the bottom quartile and higher than 19% for the top quartile. The average and median values of Llab;wwI
amount to 13% and 11% respectively, meaning that on average a worker who were hypothetically to move
from a low-prot to a high-prot rm, would experience a wage increase of 13% ceteris paribus. Focusing
on the rst variant of rent-sharing parameters, we do not nd evidence of rent sharing for the rst quartile
industries but estimate the absolute extent of rent-sharing parameter


lab;ww
I

to be higher than 0.20 for
the top quartile. The average and median values of 
lab;ww
I are estimated at 0.10 and 0.08 respectively.
The second variant results in rent-sharing parameters which are about 23% lower than those using the rst
variant.
Does not controlling for interrm skill di¤erences generate an upward bias in the price-quantity, i.e. wage-
protability, relationship as found in the literature? To answer this question, we focus on the wage estimates
using a rms average wage as the dependent variable. We conrm that not taking into account skill di¤erences
across wage bargains results in higher wage-prot elasticity estimates (about 30% higher). More specically,
the wage-prot elasticity

"w
N
lab;fw
I

is estimated to be lower than 0.027 for the rst quartile of industries
and higher than 0.057 for the top quartile. The average and median values of

"w
N
lab;fw
I
are both estimated
at about 0.046. As a result, we observe an increase in Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing. On
average, Lesters range increases from 13% to 19% when not taking account of systematic sorting of high-
ability workers in high-prot rms. The absolute extent of rent sharing


lab;fw
I

is estimated to be lower
than 0.10 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.27 for the top quartile. The average and median
values of 
lab;fw
I are both estimated at 0.16.
How do these elasticity estimates match up with other studies? Drawing on rm-level data, the estimated
elasticity between wages and prots per worker ranges between 0.01 and 0.30. Using data on Anglo-Saxon
countries, Carruth and Oswald (1987), Denny and Machin (1991), Christodes and Oswald (1992), Blanch-
ower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997) nd a central elasticity estimate of 0.04. These low
estimates could be the result of not (adequately) controlling for the endogeneity of rents. Conrming this
presumption, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada, Teal (1996) for Ghana, Van Reenen (1996) for the
UK and Estevao and Tevlin (2003) for the US report an elasticity estimate between 0.15 and 0.30. Studies
drawing on matched employer-employee data report lower estimates. Margolis and Salvanes (2001) for France
and Norway, and Arai (2003) for Sweden nd an elasticity estimate in the [0:01-0:03]-range. Using a cross-
section of manufacturing workers, Fakhfakh and FitzRoy (2004) point to an elasticity of 0.02 for France. For
Belgium, Rycx and Tojerow (2004) and Du Caju et al. (2011) obtain an elasticity estimate of 0.06 and 0.03,
respectively. Guertzgen (2009) and Martins (2009) nd an wage-prot elasticity varying between 0.02 and
0.07 for Germany and Portugal, respectively. Note, however, that these studies consider all manufacturing
industries while our focus is on the IC-EB-industries.
We checked the sensitivity of the absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters and Lesters range of wages
due to rent sharing to (i) the measurement of the alternative wage and (ii) not controlling for di¤erences in
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rmscapital intensity. In particular, we measure the alternative wage by either the 1st or the 10th percentile
value of the worker wage distribution of the employing rm i at time t. This sensitivity check is summarized
in Table B.7 and visualized in Graphs B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B. Let us focus the discussion on the rst
variant of the median absolute extent of rent-sharing parameter estimates. These estimates only appear to be
sensitive to the choice of the alternative wage value when controlling for systematic sorting of unobservably
high-ability workers into high-prot rms (see Graph B.1a). As expected, we nd that a decrease in the
alternative wage value increases the median absolute extent of rent sharing (
lab;ww
I increases from 0.08 to
0.11) whilst the opposite holds for an increase in the alternative wage value (
lab;ww
I decreases from 0.08 to
0.04). Not controlling for di¤erences in rmscapital intensity signicantly increases the median absolute
extent of rent-sharing parameter estimates. This is true irrespective of whether or not taking into account
unobserved worker ability: 
lab;ww
I increases from 0.08 to 0.14 and 
lab;fw
I from 0.16 to 0.23 (see Graph B.1c).
The same pattern holds when focusing on the impact on Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing (see
Graphs B.2a and B.2b).
4 Accounting approach
4.1 Theoretical framework
This section discusses the accounting approach to recovering the extent of rent sharing. From a conceptual
point of view, the accounting approach is similar to the labor economics approach in terms of being compatible
with worker-rm negotiations that di¤er in terms of bargaining scope. Indeed, dividing the equilibrium
wage-prot relation [Eq. (19)] which is independent of the true nature of the employment functionby
total revenue (Rit) and dening the wage premium as the di¤erence between the bargained wage and the
alternative wage in the event of a bargaining dispute, wit wit, we compute directly the relative and absolute
extents of rent sharing accit and 
acc
it from the rm accounting information as follows:
accit =
(wit   wit)Nit
PitQit   witNit   jitMit (31)
accit =
accit
1 + accit
=
(wit   wit)Nit
PitQit   witNit   jitMit (32)
4.2 Data requirements: Firm-level panel
Similar to the productivity approach, the accounting approach allows to uncover industry-specic rent-sharing
parameters from production data with only information on production values, usage of variable inputs and
input costs, therefore only exploiting the rm-level panel. Contrary to the productivity approach, however,
the accounting approach requires a measure of the alternative wage (wit), which we proxy by the 5th percentile
value of the rm wage distribution in the industry in which the rm operates. In addition to the variables
discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.3, Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation and quartile values of the
labor share computed at the alternative wage (N )it and the wage premium (wit   wit).
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4.3 Average rent-sharing parameters in IC-EB-industries
From Eq. (31), it is clear that variations in the wedge between the wage premium of all employees and the
rms short-run prot identify the relative extent of rent sharing. For each industry within the IC-EB-
regime, the left part of Table 4 presents the distribution of the rm-specic relative and absolute extent of
rent-sharing parameters (accit and 
acc
it , respectively), which highlights within-industry variation in the extent
of rent sharing. The industries in Table 4 are ranked according to the median value of accit . Focusing on the
median distribution, the absolute extent of rent-sharing (median value of accit ) is computed to be lower than
0.27 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.36 for the upper quartile. The average and median
values are both equal to 0.32. The right part of Table 4 reports the corresponding average industry-specic
wage-prot elasticities and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing. Consistent with the productivity
approach, we consider for each of them two variants. Focusing on the rst variant, we nd an average
(median) wage-prot elasticity and Lester statistic that is about 8% (25%) higher than the corresponding
estimate based on the productivity approach. In particular, the wage-prot elasticity

"w
N
acc
I

is computed
to be lower than 0.28 for the bottom quartile of industries and higher than 0.33 for the top quartile. The
average and median values of

"w
N
acc
I
are both computed to be 0.31, implying that on average a doubling of
prots per employee increases ceteris paribus average rm wages by 31%. Lesters range of wages due to rent
sharing is lower than 0.95 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 1.38 for the top quartile. The
average and median values of L
acc
I amount to 1.27 and 1.25 respectively. Hence, on average, it appears that
the wage of a worker would increase by 127% if she moved from a low-prot to a high-prot rm, keeping all
her other characteristics unchanged.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
How sensitive are the absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters and Lesters range of wages due to rent
sharing to the measurement of the alternative wage? We compare the baseline computation of the absolute
extent of rent sharing (median value of accit ) to 5 di¤erent values of the alternative wage: the 1
st or the
10th percentile value of the rm wage distribution, or the 1st, 5th or 10th percentile value of the worker wage
distribution.14 This sensitivity check is reported in Table B.7 and visualized in Graph B.3 in Appendix B.
Focusing on the computation of the absolute extent of rent sharing, we nd that decreasing the alternative
wage value based on the rm wage distribution increases the median absolute extent of rent sharing from 0.32
to 0.42, whilst an increase in the alternative wage value decrease this rent-sharing parameter from 0.32 to 0.26.
Measuring the alternative wage based on the worker wage distribution leads to a large increase in the rent-
sharing parameter (from 0.32 to 0.55). The magnitude of the increase does not depend on the percentile value
of the worker wage distribution (see Graph B.3a). The same pattern holds when evaluating the sensitivity
of the baseline computation of Lesters range of wages (L
acc
I ) to di¤erent values of the alternative wage (see
Graph B.3b).
14Measuring the alternative wage based on the worker wage distribution evidently requires resorting to the matched worker-rm
panel.
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5 A comparison of rent-sharing parameters across approaches
How sizeable are di¤erences in average measures of rent sharing across the productivity approach, the labor
economics approach and the accounting approach for industries within the IC-EB-regime? To highlight
these di¤erences, which can be attributable to di¤erences in the sources of identication of the rent-sharing
parameters and to di¤erences in modeling assumptions, Table 5 presents the distribution of relative and
absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters, wage-prot elasticities and Lesters range of wages due to rent
sharing across the three approaches. In this section, we concentrate on the rst variant of the relevant
rent-sharing parameters.
Given that we take the productivity approach as our benchmark, we rst focus the discussion on the industry-
specic absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters. Looking at within-approach industry di¤erences in this
rent-sharing parameter, we observe the most sizeable dispersion within the labor economics approach using
worker wages as the dependent variable (interquartile range of 0.20) and the smallest dispersion within the
accounting approach (interquartile range of 0.10). Hence, as expected, exploiting the worker-rm information
clearly widens the distribution of absolute extent of rent sharing parameters. Looking at industry di¤erences
in this rent-sharing parameter across approaches, the median value varies between 0.08 and 0.32. Taking
into account non-random sorting of high-ability (and thus high-wage) workers into high-prot rms, we nd
an average absolute rent-sharing parameter of 0.08. Not controlling for interemployer di¤erences in workers
skills within the labor economics approach results in a doubling of this median parameter (value of 0.16).
Moving to either the productivity or the accounting approach leads to another doubling of this value (value
of 0.29 or 0.32, respectively).
Recall that obtaining wage-prot elasticities from relative extent of rent-sharing parameter estimates using
either the productivity or the accounting approach requires multiplying the latter by the average smoothed
ratio of prots to the wage bill. Sizeable industry variation in this ratio causes di¤erences in absolute
extent of rent sharing parameters across approaches to be mapped into even larger di¤erences in wage-
prot elasticities.15 Looking at industry di¤erences in the latter across approaches, the median wage-prot
elasticity is estimated to range between 0.035 (labor economics approach controlling for unobserved worker
ability) and 0.30 (accounting approach). The wage-prot elasticities based on either the productivity or
the accounting approach are 6 (8) times larger than the ones based on the labor economics approach not
controlling (controlling) for unobserved worker heterogeneity. Within the labor economics approach, our
results show that not controlling for skill di¤erences across wage bargains increase the average responsiveness
of wages to rm protability by 50%.
These sizeable wage-prot elasticity di¤erences across approaches have important consequences when it comes
to evaluating the contribution of variability in rm protability to observed wage inequality. Recall that,
for each of the three approaches, Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing is obtained by multiplying the
wage-prot elasticities by four times the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean value of smoothed prots
15More specically, the average smoothed ratio of prots to the wage bill is lower than 0.51 for the rst quartile of IC-EB-
industries and higher than 0.87 for the upper quartile. The average and median values of this ratio are computed to be 0.70
and 0.61, respectively.
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per employee.16 As the average of this ratio is about 1, the median value of Lesters range of wages due to
rent sharing measuring the implications on wages due to a movement from the bottom to the top of the
prots distribution which is assumed to have a width of four standard deviationsvaries between 11% (labor
economics approach controlling for unobserved worker ability) and 123% (accounting approach).
<Insert Table 5 about here>
To illustrate the di¤erences in rent-sharing behavior across the three approaches graphically, Graphs 1 and 2
present box diagrams for the relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters, wage prot elasticities
and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing by approach within the IC-EB-regime. Graph 1 shows the
rst variant of the relevant parameters whereas Graph 2 displays the second variant.
<Insert Graphs 1 & 2 about here>
Table 6 presents a matrix giving the correlations between all pairs of the di¤erent rent-sharing measures.
Two types of correlations are reported: Spearmans rank correlation coe¢ cients and biweight midcorrelation
coe¢ cients. The latter, which is based on Wilcox (2005), gives a correlation that is less sensitive to outliers
and therefore more robust. Focusing on the absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters, Table 6 reports a
strong and signicantly positive correlation between (i) prodI (productivity approach) and median value of
accit (accounting approach), (ii) 
lab;ww
I (labor economics approach controlling for unobserved worker ability)
and 
lab;fw
I (labor economics approach not controlling for unobserved worker ability) and (iii) 
lab;fw
I and
median value of accit . These correlations hold for both types of correlation coe¢ cients. In addition, we
nd a signicantly positive robust correlation between prodI and 
lab;fw
I . None of the wage-prot elasticity
correlations appear to be signicant. Focusing on Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing, Table 6 presents
a signicantly positive correlation between (i) L
prod
I (productivity approach) and L
lab;fw
I (labor economics
approach not controlling for unobserved worker ability) and (ii) L
prod
I and L
acc
I (accounting approach). This
is true for both types of correlation coe¢ cients with the robust correlation coe¢ cients being very small. In
addition, we observe a signicantly positive robust correlation between (i) L
prod
I and L
lab;ww
I (labor economics
approach controlling for unobserved worker ability), (ii) Llab;wwI and L
acc
I and (iii) L
lab;fw
I and L
acc
I .
<Insert Table 6 about here>
Rent sharing introduces allocative ine¢ ciencies into an economy through distorting factor prices. Therefore,
identifying and quantifying this potential type of market failure is important for both academic research
and policy analysis. The three approaches discussed above are based on di¤erent statistical and economic
assumptions which drive the observed rent-sharing di¤erences across approaches.17 As such, our analysis
makes clear that the three approaches face important trade-o¤s. The big advantages of the productivity
approach are that only standard production data are required to recover rent-sharing parameters, there
is no need to measure the user cost of capital or the alternative wage, nor is it necessary to assume a
constant-returns-to scale production function. Measuring the user cost of capital has proven to be di¢ cult
16This ratio is lower than 0.88 for the rst quartile of IC-EB-industries and higher than 1.11 for the upper quartile. The
average and median values of this ratio are computed to be 1.01 and 0.97, respectively.
17We consider addressing/testing empirically the di¤erent sets of assumptions of the three approaches as an interesting avenue
for future research but beyond the scope of this paper.
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and necessitates ad hoc assumptions on capital markets and on how rms depreciate their assets whilst
imposing constant returns to scale assumes that every increase in inputs leads to a proportional increase
in output. The productivity approach comes, however, at the cost of imposing a particular bargaining
scope (bargaining issues involve wage and employment) and a Cobb-Douglas production function. The labor
economics approach entails the advantage of being compatible with worker-rm negotiations that di¤er in
terms of bargaining scope and puts no restrictions on the functional form of the production function. In
order to control for interemployer di¤erences in workers skills, the researcher has to rely on a matched
worker-rm panel. In addition, one needs to choose a particular measurement of the workersalternative
wage. Similar to the productivity approach, the accounting approach has the merit of only relying on rm
accounting information. Similar to the labor economics approach, the derived rent-sharing parameters are
independent of the true nature of the employment function. Notable disadvantages are that the researcher
has to assume a constant-returns-to-scale production function and a particular measurement of the workers
alternative wage.18
The main message of our results is that the use of the di¤erent approaches should depend on the data
at hand and the specic research question we are trying to answer. Conditional on being interested in
an average rent-sharing parameter across a specied set of producers, the productivity approach proves
particularly useful (i) when it comes to analyzing how changes in the operating environment of rms such
as e.g. privatization and deregulation, investments in R&D and ICT, trade liberalization and fragmentation
of production chainsa¤ect the division of surplus between capital and labor, (ii) to assess simultaneously
the impact of such shifters on both rmsprice-cost mark-up and workersrent-sharing parameters and (iii)
to examine the extent to which product and labor market imperfections might impact aggregate TFP via
generating misallocation of resources. Freeing up the data requirements, the productivity approach lends
itself to a comparative analysis (at the cross-country/cross-industry/cross-rm-group level). Taking into
account worker heterogeneity, the labor economics approach is well suited for (i) assessing the extent to
which the wage-prot relation varies across groups of workers that di¤er in terms of e.g. gender, tenure or
skill level, (ii) evaluating the contribution of these group di¤erences in rent sharing to gender and other
types of wage inequality and (iii) analyzing the e¤ect of changes in rm-level decision variables such as
di¤erent types of innovations, exporting, product introduction on workers bargaining power. Leaving
aside the closed-economy perspective, the labor economics approach also allows to examine the relative
importance of domestic versus international rent sharing in determining workerswage outcomes after e.g. a
cross-border merger or acquisition. Without having to deal with the many challenges in econometric methods
and techniques, the accounting approach provides a basic measure of rent sharing based on rm accounting
information only.
So far, we have based our comparison on the IC-EB-industries with the purpose of selecting industries
where rent-sharing behavior is likely to be observed. For reasons of completeness, Table B.8 in Appendix
B reports the distribution of absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters and Lesters range of wages due to
rent sharing across the three approaches for the two other predominant regimes (PC-MO and IC-PR).19
18Note that in the accounting approach, the constant-returns-to-scale assumption could be relaxed if the researcher is willing
to measure the user cost of capital.
19Note that within the productivity approach, our classication procedure imposes negative rent-sharing parameters on PC-
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When controlling for the systematic sorting of unobservably high-ability workers into high-prot rms, the
median values of both rent-sharing measures based on the labor economics approach are found to be the
highest for IC-EB-industries and the lowest for PC-MO-industries. The median values of both rent-sharing
measures are estimated to be the highest for IC-PR-industries and the lowest for PC-MO-industries when
not controlling for unobserved worker ability in the labor economics approach. Only minor di¤erences in
the distribution of both rent-sharing measures across the predominant regimes are observed when using the
accounting approach.20
6 Conclusion
Empirical labor economists have resorted to estimating the responsiveness of workerswages to rmsability
to pay to assess the extent to which employers share rents with their employees. This paper compares this
labor economics approach with two other approaches that rely on standard micro production data only: the
productivity approach for which estimates of the output elasticities of labor and materials and data on the
respective revenue shares are needed and the accounting approach which boils down to directly computing
the extent of rent sharing from rm accounting information.
Using an unbalanced panel of 103,995 employees working in 14,921 rms belonging to 52 manufacturing
industries over the period 1984-2001 in France, we take the productivity approach as our benchmark and
select the subset of industries where rent sharing behavior is most likely to be observed, i.e. industries that are
characterized by imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market.
For these 25 IC-EB-industries, we provide micro evidence on rent sharing from orthogonal directions by
exploiting di¤erent dimensions in the data. We nd a median absolute extent of rent sharing of about
0.30 using either the productivity or the accounting approach. Only using rm-level information brings this
median rent-sharing parameter down to 0.16 using the labor economics approach. Controlling for unobserved
worker ability, thereby considering the possibility that high-ability workers might be systematically sorted
into high-prot rms, further reduces the median absolute extent of rent sharing to 0.08. Our results conrm
that the three di¤erent approaches face important trade-o¤s in terms of statistical and economic assumptions.
The main message of this article is that empirical economists interested in establishing that prots are shared
should select the appropriate approach based on the particular research question and on the data at hand.
Our ndings raise possible directions for future work. Both the productivity and the labor economics approach
are reduced-form approaches. First, an evident continuation is to align both approaches by setting up
a simultaneous equations model composed of a production function, a demand function, a pricing rule,
cost share equations for variable input factors (taking into account some type of worker heterogeneity) and
separate wage equations for di¤erent groups of workers. Second, similar to comparing rent-sharing estimates
derived from the productivity approach and the labor economics approach, it would be interesting to examine
di¤erences between wage elasticity estimates of the labor supply to rms recovered from the productivity
approach and those obtained by regressing the decision to separate from a rm on an individual workers
MO-industries.
20We might tentatively conclude from this observation that the accounting approach is far less capable of detecting di¤erences
in rent-sharing behavior across regimes.
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wage (wage elasticities of separations), the latter being a standard practice in the empirical labor economics
literature. Third, following Fitzenberger (2014) in his comments on Alison Booths (Booth, 2014) survey
paper on Wage determination and imperfect competition, a challenging extension of our productivity
approach would be to go beyond the simple dichotomy of either consolidating market power on the supply
side of labor or consolidating market power on the demand side by integrating wage determination under
trade unions and wage determination under oligopsonistic competition.
References
[1] Abowd JM, Kramarz F, Margolis D. 1999. High wage workers and high wage rms. Econometrica 67(2):
251-334.
[2] Abowd JM, Lemieux T. 1993. The e¤ects of product market competition on collective bargaining agree-
ments: The case of foreign competition in Canada. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(4): 983-1014.
[3] Abraham F, Konings J, Vanormelingen S. 2009. The e¤ect of globalization on union bargaining and
price-cost margins of rms. Review of World Economics 145(1): 13-36.
[4] Akerlof G, Yellen J. 1986. E¢ ciency wage models of the labor market. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
[5] Andersen TG, Sørensen BE. 1996. GMM estimation of a stochastic volatility model: A Monte Carlo
study. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 14(3): 328-352.
[6] Andrews M, Schank T, Upward R. 2006. Practical xed e¤ects estimation methods for the three-way
error components model. Stata Journal 6(4): 461-481.
[7] Arai M. 2003. Wages, prots, and capital intensity: Evidence from matched worker-rm data. Journal
of Labor Economics 21(3): 593-618.
[8] Arellano M, Bond SR. 1991. Some tests of specication for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an
application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies 58(2): 277-297.
[9] Arellano M, Bover O. 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components
models. Journal of Econometrics 68(1): 29-51.
[10] Blanchower DG, Oswald AJ, Garrett MD. 1990. Insider power in wage determination. Economica
57(226): 143-170.
[11] Blanchower DG, Oswald AJ, Sanfey P. 1996. Wages, prots and rent sharing. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 111(444): 227-252.
[12] Blundell RW, Bond SR. 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models.
Journal of Econometrics 87(1): 115-143.
[13] Booth A. 2014. Wage determination and imperfect competition. Labour Economics 30: 53-58.
25
[14] Boulhol H, Dobbelaere S, Maioli M. 2011. Imports as product and labour market discipline. British
Journal of Industrial Relations 49(2): 331-361.
[15] Bowsher CG. 2002. On testing overidentifying restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Economics
Letters 77(2): 211-220.
[16] Brock E, Dobbelaere S. 2006. Has international trade a¤ected workersbargaining power? Review of
World Economics 142(6): 233-266.
[17] Bronars S, Famulari M. 2001. Shareholder wealth and wages: Evidence for white-collar workers. Journal
of Political Economy 109(2): 328-354.
[18] Bughin J. 1996. Trade unions and rmsproduct market power. Journal of Industrial Economics 44(3):
289-307.
[19] Carruth A, Oswald A. 1987. Wage inexibility in Britain. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
49(1): 59-78.
[20] Christodes LN, Oswald AJ. 1992. Real wage determination and rent sharing in collective bargaining
agreements. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3): 985-1002.
[21] Crépon B, Desplatz R, Mairesse J. 1999. Estimating price-cost margins, scale economies and workers
bargaining power at the rm level. CREST Working Paper G9917. Centre de Recherche en Economie
et Statistique.
[22] Crépon B, Desplatz R, Mairesse J. 2005. Price-cost margins and rent sharing: Evidence from a panel
of French manufacturing rms. Annales dEconomie et de Statistique, Special issue in memory of Zvi
Griliches 79/80: 585-611.
[23] Denny K, Machin S. 1991. The role of protability and industrial wages in rm level wage determination.
Fiscal Studies 12(2): 34-45.
[24] Dobbelaere S. 2004. Estimation of price-cost margins and union bargaining power for Belgian manufac-
turing. International Journal of Industrial Organization 22(10): 1381-1398.
[25] Dobbelaere S, Kiyota K, Mairesse J. 2015a. Production and labor market imperfections and scale
economies: Micro-evidence on France, Japan and the Netherlands. Journal of Comparative Economics
43(2): 290-322.
[26] Dobbelaere S, Lauterbach R, Mairesse J. 2015b. Micro-evidence on product and labor market regime
di¤erences between Chile and France, mimeo.
[27] Dobbelaere S, Vancauteren M. 2014. Market imperfections, skills and total factor productivity: Firm-
level evidence on Belgium and the Netherlands. NBB Discussion Paper 267. National Bank of Belgium.
[28] Dobbelaere S, Mairesse J. 2013. Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor
market imperfections. Journal of Applied Econometrics 28(1): 1-46.
26
[29] Du Caju P, Rycx F, Tojerow I. 2011. Inter-industry wage di¤erentials: How much does rent sharing
matter? Manchester School 79(4): 691-717.
[30] Du¤y J, Papageorgiou C, Perez-Sebastian F. 2004. Capital-skill complementarity? Evidence from a
panel of countries. Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1): 327-344.
[31] Dumont M, Rayp G, Willemé P. 2006. Does internationalization a¤ect union bargaining power? An
empirical study for ve EU countries. Oxford Economic Papers 58(1): 77-102.
[32] Estevao M, Tevlin S. 2003. Do rms share their success with workers? The response of wages to product
market conditions. Economica 70(280): 597-617.
[33] Fakhfakh F, Fitzroy F. 2004. Basic wages and rm characteristics: Rent sharing in French manufacturing.
Labour 18(4): 615-631.
[34] Fitzenberger B. 2014. Comments on Wage determination and imperfect competition. Labour Eco-
nomics 30: 59-61.
[35] Gibbons R, Katz L. 1992. Does unmeasured ability explain inter-industry wage di¤erentials? Review of
Economic Studies 59(3): 515-535.
[36] Goos M, Konings J. 2001. Does rent-sharing exist in Belgium? An empirical analysis using rm level
data. Reets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique XL(1/2): 65-79.
[37] Griliches Z. 1969. Capital-skill complementarity. Review of Economics and Statistics 51(4): 465-68.
[38] Guertzgen N. 2009. Rent-sharing and collective bargaining coverage: Evidence from linked employer-
employee data,. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 111(2): 323-349.
[39] Hall RE. 1988. The relationship between price and marginal cost in US industry. Journal of Political
Economy 96(5): 921-947.
[40] Haskel J, Martin C. 1992. Margins, concentration, unions and the business cycle: Theory and evidence
for Britain. International Journal of Industrial Organization 10(4): 611-632.
[41] Hildreth AKG, Oswald AJ. 1997. Rent sharing and wages: Evidence from company and establishment
panels. Journal of Labor Economics 15(2): 318-337.
[42] Holmlund B, Zetterberg J. 1991. Insider e¤ects in wage determination: Evidence from ve countries.
European Economic Review 35(5): 1009-1035.
[43] Holtz-Eakin D, Newey W, Rosen HS. 1988. Estimating Vector Autoregressions with panel data. Econo-
metrica 56(6): 1371-1395.
[44] Katz LF, Summers LH. 1989. Industry rents: Evidence and implications. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity: Microeconomics: 209-275.
[45] Klette TJ, Griliches Z. 1996. The inconsistency of common scale estimators when output prices are
unobserved and endogenous. Journal of Applied Econometrics 11(4): 343-361.
27
[46] Kramarz F. 2003. Wages and international trade. CEPR Discussion Paper 3936. Centre for Economic
Policy Research.
[47] Lester R. 1952. A range theory of wage di¤erentials. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 5(4): 483-
500.
[48] Manning A. 2003. Monopsony in motion: Imperfect competition in labor markets. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
[49] Margolis DN, Salvanes K. 2001. Do rms really share rents with their employees? IZA Discussion Paper
330.
[50] Martins PS. 2007. Rent sharing and wages. Reets et Perspectives XLVI(2-3): 23-31.
[51] Martins PS. 2009. Rent sharing before and after the wage bill. Applied Economics 42(17): 2133-2151.
[52] McDonald IM, Solow RM. 1981. Wage bargaining and employment. American Economic Review 71(5):
896-908.
[53] Nekby L. 2003. Gender di¤erences in rent sharing and its implications for the gender wage gap, evidence
from Sweden. Economics Letters 81(3): 403-410.
[54] Nickell SJ, Andrews M. 1983. Unions, real wages and employment in Britain 1951-79. Oxford Economic
Papers 35(supplement): 183-205.
[55] Nickell SJ, Vainiomaki V, Wadhwani S. 1994. Wages and product market power. Economica 61(244):
457-473.
[56] Roodman DM. 2009. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics 71(1): 135-158.
[57] Rycx F, Tojerow I. 2004. Rent sharing and the gender wage gap in Belgium. International Journal of
Manpower 25(3/4): 279-299.
[58] Shapiro C, Stiglitz JE. 1984. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. American Eco-
nomic Review 74(3): 433-444.
[59] Teal F. 1996. The size and sources of economic rents in a developing country manufacturing labour
market. Economic Journal 106(437): 963-976.
[60] Van Beveren I. 2012. Total factor productivity: A practical review. Journal of Economic Surveys 26(1):
98-128.
[61] Van Reenen J. 1996. The creation and capture of rents: Wages and innovation in a panel of U.K.
companies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(1): 195-226.
[62] Wilcox RR. 2005. Introduction to robust estimation and hypothesis testing (Statistical Modeling and
Decision Science). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
28
[63] Windmeijer F. 2005. A nite sample correction for the variance of linear e¢ cient two-step GMM esti-
mators. Journal of Econometrics 126(1): 25-51.
[64] Wooldridge J. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross sections and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
29
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (1984-2001)
Variables mean sd Q1 Q2 Q3 N
Real rm output growth rate qit 0.031 0.150 -0.052 0.027 0.112 145,979
Labor growth rate nit 0.011 0.124 -0.041 0.000 0.061 145,979
Materials growth rate mit 0.044 0.191 -0.057 0.041 0.144 145,979
Capital growth rate kit 0.005 0.153 -0.070 -0.015 0.069 145,979
Labor share in nominal output (N )it 0.307 0.135 0.211 0.291 0.385 165,315
Labor share computed at the alternative wage wit (N )it 0.229 0.088 0.170 0.219 0.276 165,315
Materials share in nominal output (M )it 0.513 0.155 0.416 0.521 0.621 165,315
1  (N )it   (M )it 0.180 0.112 0.101 0.157 0.230 165,315
Prots per employee
 

N

it
22,052 28,830 7,384 14,021 26,323 165,315
Smoothed prots per employee g  N it 22,142 27,040 8,535 14,662 26,184 165,315
Capital intensity
 
K
N

it
31,382 30,439 12,493 22,505 39,095 165,315
Number of employees Nit 140 286 34 54 131 165,315
Firm average wage per worker wit 27,837 7,808 22,238 26,950 32,437 165,315
Wage premium wit   wit 8,321 6,364 3,807 71249 11,704 165,315
Number of employees Nj(i)t 24 43 4 10 26 648,889
Average wage per worker wj(i)t 16,300 9,033 11,078 14,022 18,435 648,889
REGIME R = IC-EB (1984-2001)
Variables mean sd Q1 Q2 Q3 N
Real rm output growth rate qit 0.026 0.150 -0.058 0.022 0.108 96,508
Labor growth rate nit 0.009 0.126 -0.042 0.000 0.060 96,508
Materials growth rate mit 0.044 0.194 -0.061 0.039 0.145 96,508
Capital growth rate kit 0.003 0.154 -0.072 -0.018 0.067 96,508
Labor share in nominal output (N )it 0.328 0.136 0.231 0.314 0.407 109,199
Labor share computed at the alternative wage wit (N )it 0.247 0.088 0.187 0.237 0.292 109,199
Materials share in nominal output (M )it 0.494 0.150 0.401 0.502 0.599 109,199
1  (N )it   (M )it 0.177 0.106 0.102 0.156 0.228 109,199
Prots per employee
 

N

it
19,392 24,491 6,790 12,678 23,309 109,199
Smoothed prots per employee g  N it 19,734 22,939 7,958 13,415 23,512 109,199
Capital intensity
 
K
N

it
30,371 29,734 11,997 21,582 37,902 109,199
Number of employees Nit 123 255 32 49 116 109,199
Firm average wage per worker wit 27,381 7,612 21,944 26,667 31,907 109,199
Wage premium wit   wit 8,103 6.283 3.662 7,023 11,372 109,199
Number of employees Nj(i)t 21 42 3 9 22 382,501
Average wage per worker wj(i)t 15,919 8,882 10,807 13,690 18,046 382,501
Notes: wit is dened as the 5
th percentile value of the rm wage distribution by industry and year.g  
N

it
is dened as 15
tP
k=t 4
 

N

ik
if
 

N

it 4 is not missing,
otherwise equal to 14
tP
k=t 3
 

N

ik
.
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Table 2: Productivity approach: Industry-specic relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters,
wage-prot elasticities and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing in R = IC-EB
Ind. I prodI 
prod
I

"w
N
prod
I
g
"w
N
prod
I
L
prod
I
eLprodI
39 0.115 (0.196) 0.103 (0.158) 0.121 (0.207) 0.121 (0.207) 0.675 0.672
44 0.141 (0.138) 0.124 (0.106) 0.103 (0.101) 0.107 (0.105) 0.473 0.492
20 0.210 (0.372) 0.173 (0.254) 0.107 (0.189) 0.120 (0.212) 0.408 0.458
33 0.231 (0.129) 0.188 (0.085) 0.235 (0.131) 0.252 (0.141) 0.876 0.940
8 0.255 (0.157) 0.203 (0.099) 0.171 (0.105) 0.189 (0.116) 0.605 0.671
31 0.286 (0.115) 0.223 (0.069) 0.294 (0.118) 0.315 (0.126) 0.732 0.783
46 0.291 (0.279) 0.225 (0.168) 0.398 (0.382) 0.402 (0.386) 1.450 1.464
38 0.316 (0.354) 0.240 (0.204) 0.359 (0.403) 0.401 (0.450) 0.750 0.838
29 0.317 (0.578) 0.241 (0.333) 0.199 (0.362) 0.235 (0.428) 0.827 0.977
45 0.319 (0.220) 0.242 (0.127) 0.279 (0.193) 0.310 (0.214) 0.844 0.939
5 0.369 (0.150) 0.269 (0.080) 0.345 (0.140) 0.357 (0.145) 1.782 1.843
7 0.373 (0.278) 0.272 (0.147) 0.254 (0.189) 0.263 (0.196) 1.315 1.361
43 0.411 (0.341) 0.291 (0.171) 0.229 (0.190) 0.236 (0.196) 0.678 0.700
18 0.421 (0.519) 0.296 (0.257) 0.234 (0.288) 0.249 (0.307) 1.029 1.098
19 0.469 (0.577) 0.319 (0.267) 0.221 (0.272) 0.234 (0.288) 0.979 1.037
11 0.478 (0.231) 0.323 (0.106) 0.272 (0.131) 0.284 (0.137) 1.100 1.149
52 0.479 (0.300) 0.324 (0.137) 0.226 (0.142) 0.244 (0.153) 0.978 1.054
47 0.482 (0.220) 0.325 (0.100) 0.250 (0.114) 0.259 (0.118) 0.626 0.649
26 0.550 (0.405) 0.355 (0.169) 0.254 (0.187) 0.269 (0.199) 0.983 1.042
21 0.599 (0.292) 0.374 (0.114) 0.191 (0.093) 0.198 (0.097) 0.742 0.772
36 0.657 (0.321) 0.397 (0.117) 0.316 (0.154) 0.336 (0.164) 1.204 1.283
49 0.685 (0.140) 0.406 (0.049) 0.543 (0.111) 0.548 (0.112) 2.272 2.289
34 0.809 (0.256) 0.447 (0.078) 0.493 (0.156) 0.509 (0.161) 2.795 2.884
48 0.810 (0.147) 0.447 (0.045) 0.403 (0.073) 0.418 (0.076) 1.335 1.386
6 1.130 (0.223) 0.531 (0.049) 0.621 (0.122) 0.639 (0.126) 3.969 4.084
Ind. mean 0.448 (0.278) 0.294 (0.140) 0.285 (0.182) 0.300 (0.194) 1.177 1.235
Ind. Q1 0.291 (0.157) 0.225 (0.085) 0.221 (0.118) 0.235 (0.126) 0.732 0.772
Ind. Q2 0.411 (0.256) 0.291 (0.117) 0.254 (0.154) 0.263 (0.161) 0.978 1.037
Ind. Q3 0.550 (0.341) 0.355 (0.169) 0.345 (0.193) 0.357 (0.212) 1.315 1.361
Notes:
prodI =

prod
I
1+
prod
I
,

"w
N
prod
I
= prodI  mean
 g 
wN

it

,
g
"w
N
prod
I
= prodI  e
0B@meanln g( wN )it

+

s d

ln
g
( wN )it
2
2
1CA
,
L
prod
I =

"w
N
prod
I
 4
sd
 g( N )it

mean
 g( N )it
 , eLprodI = g"w
N
prod
I
 4
sd
 g( N )it

mean
 g( N )it
 .
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Table 3: Labor economics approach: Industry-specic wage-prot elasticities, Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing
and relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters in R = IC-EB
Dep. var. Worker wage ln(wj(i)t)
Ind. I

"w
N
lab;ww
I
Llab;wwI 
lab;ww
I elab;wwI lab;wwI elab;wwI
19 -0.028 (0.015) -0.125 -0.202 (0.105) -0.154 (0.081) -0.253 (0.165) -0.183 (0.113)
8 -0.034 (0.022) -0.119 -0.170 (0.113) -0.113 (0.075) -0.204 (0.164) -0.127 (0.096)
21 -0.007 (0.024) -0.029 -0.060 (0.196) -0.050 (0.163) -0.064 (0.222) -0.052 (0.180)
36 -0.009 (0.026) -0.036 -0.054 (0.149) -0.044 (0.122) -0.057 (0.167) -0.046 (0.134)
45 -0.012 (0.012) -0.037 -0.053 (0.052) -0.029 (0.029) -0.056 (0.058) -0.030 (0.030)
26 -0.001 (0.027) -0.003 -0.006 (0.172) -0.005 (0.142) -0.006 (0.174) -0.005 (0.143)
43 0.000 (0.014) 0.001 0.001 (0.045) 0.001 (0.041) 0.001 (0.045) 0.001 (0.041)
46 0.005 (0.038) 0.017 0.007 (0.058) 0.006 (0.052) 0.007 (0.057) 0.006 (0.051)
47 0.003 (0.023) 0.009 0.013 (0.085) 0.011 (0.072) 0.013 (0.083) 0.011 (0.071)
49 0.013 (0.027) 0.053 0.034 (0.073) 0.029 (0.061) 0.033 (0.068) 0.028 (0.058)
39 0.035 (0.031) 0.197 0.058 (0.050) 0.056 (0.048) 0.054 (0.045) 0.053 (0.043)
48 0.019 (0.031) 0.063 0.085 (0.136) 0.067 (0.107) 0.078 (0.116) 0.063 (0.094)
31 0.039 (0.033) 0.096 0.086 (0.072) 0.065 (0.055) 0.079 (0.061) 0.061 (0.048)
5 0.022 (0.021) 0.113 0.089 (0.085) 0.061 (0.058) 0.082 (0.072) 0.057 (0.052)
33 0.050 (0.025) 0.186 0.124 (0.062) 0.109 (0.054) 0.111 (0.049) 0.098 (0.044)
7 0.036 (0.025) 0.185 0.142 (0.097) 0.123 (0.084) 0.124 (0.075) 0.110 (0.067)
44 0.042 (0.019) 0.194 0.199 (0.089) 0.119 (0.053) 0.166 (0.062) 0.106 (0.042)
11 0.049 (0.027) 0.200 0.249 (0.135) 0.181 (0.098) 0.199 (0.087) 0.153 (0.070)
38 0.088 (0.033) 0.183 0.252 (0.094) 0.136 (0.051) 0.202 (0.060) 0.119 (0.039)
34 0.064 (0.025) 0.362 0.290 (0.113) 0.243 (0.095) 0.225 (0.068) 0.195 (0.061)
18 0.061 (0.031) 0.267 0.297 (0.149) 0.251 (0.127) 0.229 (0.089) 0.201 (0.081)
29 0.040 (0.032) 0.167 0.333 (0.267) 0.198 (0.159) 0.250 (0.150) 0.165 (0.111)
6 0.106 (0.032) 0.678 0.622 (0.190) 0.553 (0.169) 0.383 (0.072) 0.356 (0.070)
52 0.109 (0.029) 0.469 0.710 (0.191) 0.576 (0.155) 0.415 (0.065) 0.365 (0.063)
20 0.049 (0.025) 0.187 0.849 (0.440) 0.252 (0.130) 0.459 (0.129) 0.201 (0.083)
Ind. mean 0.030 (0.026) 0.131 0.156 (0.129) 0.106 (0.091) 0.099 (0.096) 0.076 (0.075)
Ind. Q1 0.000 (0.023) 0.001 0.001 (0.073) 0.001 (0.054) 0.001 (0.061) 0.001 (0.048)
Ind. Q2 0.035 (0.026) 0.113 0.086 (0.105) 0.065 (0.081) 0.079 (0.072) 0.061 (0.067)
Ind. Q3 0.049 (0.031) 0.194 0.252 (0.149) 0.181 (0.127) 0.202 (0.129) 0.153 (0.094)
32
Table 3 - Continued: Labor economics approach: Industry-specic wage-prot elasticities, Lesters range of wages
due to rent sharing and relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters in R = IC-EB
Dep. var. Firm wage ln(wit)
Ind. I

"w
N
lab;fw
I
Llab;fwI 
lab;fw
I elab;fwI lab;fwI elab;fwI
19 0.016 (0.070) 0.071 0.116 (0.504) 0.088 (0.385) 0.104 (0.405) 0.081 (0.325)
8 0.042 (0.040) 0.147 0.210 (0.203) 0.140 (0.135) 0.174 (0.139) 0.123 (0.104)
21 0.057 (0.067) 0.220 0.462 (0.547) 0.384 (0.455) 0.316 (0.256) 0.278 (0.237)
36 0.050 (0.050) 0.191 0.284 (0.287) 0.233 (0.235) 0.221 (0.174) 0.189 (0.155)
45 0.001 (0.052) 0.002 0.004 (0.225) 0.002 (0.123) 0.004 (0.224) 0.002 (0.123)
26 0.031 (0.050) 0.120 0.200 (0.326) 0.165 (0.269) 0.167 (0.226) 0.142 (0.198)
43 0.087 (0.037) 0.258 0.279 (0.118) 0.256 (0.109) 0.218 (0.072) 0.204 (0.069)
46 0.027 (0.061) 0.098 0.041 (0.093) 0.037 (0.084) 0.039 (0.086) 0.035 (0.078)
47 0.047 (0.033) 0.117 0.171 (0.122) 0.146 (0.104) 0.146 (0.089) 0.127 (0.079)
49 0.046 (0.028) 0.191 0.124 (0.076) 0.105 (0.065) 0.110 (0.060) 0.095 (0.053)
39 -0.023 (0.034) -0.127 -0.037 (0.056) -0.036 (0.054) -0.039 (0.060) -0.037 (0.058)
48 -0.001 (0.040) -0.004 -0.005 (0.176) -0.004 (0.139) -0.005 (0.178) -0.004 (0.140)
31 0.048 (0.064) 0.120 0.106 (0.142) 0.081 (0.108) 0.096 (0.116) 0.075 (0.092)
5 0.055 (0.037) 0.285 0.224 (0.151) 0.153 (0.103) 0.183 (0.101) 0.132 (0.078)
33 0.075 (0.035) 0.280 0.187 (0.088) 0.164 (0.077) 0.158 (0.062) 0.141 (0.057)
7 0.095 (0.031) 0.493 0.378 (0.122) 0.328 (0.106) 0.274 (0.064) 0.247 (0.060)
44 -0.021 (0.029) -0.098 -0.101 (0.135) -0.060 (0.081) -0.112 (0.167) -0.064 (0.092)
11 0.038 (0.035) 0.153 0.189 (0.176) 0.138 (0.128) 0.159 (0.125) 0.121 (0.099)
38 0.047 (0.047) 0.099 0.137 (0.134) 0.074 (0.072) 0.120 (0.104) 0.068 (0.063)
34 0.027 (0.035) 0.155 0.124 (0.158) 0.104 (0.132) 0.110 (0.125) 0.094 (0.109)
18 0.124 (0.033) 0.546 0.607 (0.160) 0.514 (0.136) 0.378 (0.062) 0.339 (0.059)
29 0.047 (0.057) 0.194 0.387 (0.472) 0.231 (0.281) 0.279 (0.245) 0.187 (0.186)
6 0.142 (0.037) 0.907 0.831 (0.215) 0.739 (0.191) 0.454 (0.064) 0.425 (0.063)
52 0.065 (0.053) 0.281 0.425 (0.348) 0.345 (0.282) 0.298 (0.171) 0.257 (0.156)
20 0.030 (0.035) 0.114 0.517 (0.608) 0.153 (0.180) 0.341 (0.264) 0.133 (0.135)
Ind. mean 0.046 (0.044) 0.192 0.234 (0.226) 0.179 (0.161) 0.168 (0.146) 0.136 (0.115)
Ind. Q1 0.027 (0.035) 0.099 0.116 (0.122) 0.081 (0.103) 0.104 (0.072) 0.075 (0.1063)
Ind. Q2 0.047 (0.037) 0.153 0.189 (0.160) 0.146 (0.128) 0.159 (0.125) 0.127 (0.092)
Ind. Q3 0.057 (0.052) 0.258 0.378 (0.287) 0.233 (0.191) 0.274 (0.178) 0.189 (0.140)
Notes:
Llab;wwI =

"w
N
lab;ww
I
 4
sd
 g( N )it

mean
 g( N )it
 , lab;wwI =

"w
N
lab;ww
I
mean
 g wN


it

,
elab;wwI = "wN lab;wwI  e
0B@meanln g(wN )it

+

s d

ln
g
(wN )it
2
2
1CA
, 
lab;ww
I =

lab;ww
I
1+
lab;ww
I
, elab;wwI = elab;wwI1+elab;ww
I
.
Similar formulas apply if the dependent variable is the rm average wage per worker.
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Table 4: Accounting approach: Distribution of rm-specic relative and absolute extent of
rent-sharing parameters, wage-prot elasticities and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing in R = IC-EB
Ind. I accit 
acc
it

"w
N
acc
I
g
"w
N
acc
I
L
acc
I
eLaccI
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
38 0.159 0.256 0.394 0.138 0.205 0.284 0.291 0.325 0.608 0.679
46 0.124 0.277 0.448 0.112 0.217 0.310 0.379 0.382 1.380 1.393
31 0.147 0.285 0.497 0.128 0.222 0.332 0.293 0.313 0.729 0.780
39 0.169 0.302 0.518 0.146 0.232 0.342 0.320 0.319 1.779 1.773
33 0.170 0.322 0.610 0.147 0.245 0.381 0.327 0.351 1.222 1.311
45 0.166 0.329 0.648 0.142 0.247 0.393 0.287 0.320 0.870 0.969
29 0.185 0.357 0.781 0.158 0.263 0.440 0.224 0.264 0.930 1.099
44 0.203 0.398 0.722 0.171 0.286 0.422 0.291 0.303 1.335 1.390
49 0.216 0.409 0.732 0.179 0.292 0.425 0.325 0.327 1.357 1.367
47 0.230 0.431 0.783 0.188 0.302 0.440 0.223 0.232 0.560 0.580
5 0.207 0.437 0.883 0.174 0.306 0.473 0.409 0.423 2.113 2.185
7 0.228 0.462 0.916 0.190 0.321 0.484 0.315 0.326 1.629 1.686
43 0.223 0.463 0.824 0.183 0.318 0.454 0.258 0.266 0.763 0.788
20 0.233 0.517 1.064 0.191 0.345 0.518 0.263 0.295 1.005 1.127
11 0.277 0.532 0.966 0.220 0.350 0.496 0.302 0.316 1.225 1.279
34 0.285 0.558 1.037 0.224 0.361 0.512 0.340 0.351 1.927 1.989
18 0.286 0.564 1.144 0.225 0.363 0.536 0.313 0.334 1.378 1.470
48 0.292 0.567 1.035 0.228 0.364 0.511 0.282 0.293 0.935 0.970
8 0.272 0.567 1.158 0.216 0.364 0.541 0.380 0.421 1.344 1.490
52 0.286 0.602 1.292 0.223 0.378 0.566 0.284 0.306 1.228 1.323
26 0.243 0.605 1.256 0.199 0.380 0.562 0.280 0.296 1.081 1.146
6 0.331 0.668 1.264 0.254 0.405 0.565 0.367 0.377 2.345 2.413
36 0.368 0.688 1.303 0.272 0.413 0.575 0.330 0.352 1.260 1.343
19 0.398 0.765 1.599 0.286 0.436 0.618 0.360 0.381 1.597 1.691
21 0.411 0.858 1.709 0.296 0.465 0.638 0.273 0.285 1.063 1.107
Ind. mean 0.244 0.489 0.943 0.196 0.323 0.473 0.309 0.326 1.267 1.334
Ind. Q1 0.190 0.367 0.725 0.161 0.269 0.423 0.283 0.298 0.952 1.101
Ind. Q2 0.232 0.476 0.930 0.191 0.322 0.479 0.305 0.323 1.244 1.329
Ind. Q3 0.285 0.567 1.154 0.224 0.364 0.540 0.330 0.351 1.379 1.485
Notes: accit =
(wit wit)Nit
Rit witNit jitMit , 
acc
it =
accit
1+accit
,

"w
N
acc
I
=median(accit )mean
 g 
wN

it

,
g
"w
N
acc
I
=median(accit ) e
0B@meanln g( wN )it

+

s d

ln
g
( wN )it
2
2
1CA
;
L
acc
I =

"w
N
acc
I
 4
sd
 g( N )it

mean
 g( N )it
 , eLaccI = g"w
N
acc
I
 4
sd
 g( N )it

mean
 g( N )it
 .
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Table 5: Comparison of the distribution of relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters,
wage-prot elasticities and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing
across the three approaches in R = IC-EB
mean Q1 Q2 Q3
Relative extent of rent sharing
Productivity: prodI 0.448 0.291 0.411 0.550
Labor economics: lab;wwI 0.156 0.001 0.086 0.252
Labor economics: elab;wwI 0.106 0.001 0.065 0.181
Labor economics: lab;fwI 0.234 0.116 0.189 0.378
Labor economics: elab;fwI 0.179 0.081 0.146 0.233
Accounting: median of accit 0.489 0.367 0.463 0.567
Absolute extent of rent sharing
Productivity: prodI 0.293 0.225 0.291 0.355
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
I 0.099 0.001 0.079 0.201
Labor economics: elab;wwI 0.076 0.001 0.061 0.153
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
I 0.168 0.103 0.159 0.274
Labor economics: elab;fwI 0.136 0.075 0.127 0.189
Accounting: median of accit 0.323 0.263 0.320 0.364
Wage-prot elasticity
Productivity:

"w
N
prod
I
0.293 0.229 0.282 0.346
Productivity:
g
"w
N
prod
I
0.313 0.251 0.305 0.363
Labor economics:

"w
N
lab;ww
I
0.030 0.000 0.035 0.049
Labor economics:

"w
N
lab;fw
I
0.046 0.027 0.046 0.057
Accounting:

"w
N
acc
I
0.209 0.282 0.302 0.330
Accounting:
g
"w
N
acc
I
0.326 0.296 0.320 0.351
Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing
Productivity: L
prod
I 1.333 0.807 1.104 1.464
Productivity: eLprodI 1.422 0.864 1.192 1.556
Labor economics: Llab;wwI 0.131 0.001 0.113 0.193
Labor economics: Llab;fwI 0.192 0.099 0.152 0.258
Accounting: L
acc
I 1.266 0.935 1.228 1.380
Accounting: eLaccI 1.334 1.099 1.323 1.490
Note: See Tables 2-4 for the formulas.
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Table 6: Correlation of industry-specic relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters, wage-prot elasticities and
Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing between the three approaches in R = IC-EB
Rel. extent
of rent sharing
prodI 
lab;ww
I elab;wwI lab;fwI elab;fwI Median of accit
Prod.: prodI 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: lab;wwI -0.074 [0.302] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: elab;wwI 0.002 [0.250] 0.990[0.942] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: lab;fwI 0.258 [0.253
] 0.350[0.278] 0.341[0.308] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: elab;fwI 0.375[0.200] 0.215 [0.240] 0.228 [0.281] 0.941[0.944] 1.000 [1.000]
Account.: med. of accit 0.644
[0.594] -0.185 [0.013] -0.135 [0.055] 0.541[0.553] 0.511[0.544] 1.000 [1.000]
Abs. extent
of rent sharing
prodI 
lab;ww
I
elab;wwI lab;fwI elab;fwI accit
Prod.: prodI 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: 
lab;ww
I -0.074 [0.198] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: elab;wwI 0.002 [0.199] 0.991[0.984] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: 
lab;fw
I 0.258 [0.266
] 0.350[0.410] 0.341[0.460] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: elab;fwI 0.375[0.222] 0.215 [0.380] 0.228 [0.433] 0.941[0.951] 1.000 [1.000]
Account.: med. of accit 0.643
[0.701] -0.178 [0.101] -0.128 [0.122] 0.512[0.570] 0.542[0.575] 1.000 [1.000]
Wage-prot
elasticity

"w
N
prod
I
g
"w
N
prod
I

"w
N
lab;ww
I

"w
N
lab;fw
I

"w
N
acc
I
g
"w
N
acc
I
Prod.:

"w
N
prod
I
1.000 [1.000]
Prod.:
g
"w
N
prod
I
0.985[0.999] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.:

"w
N
lab;ww
I
0.191 [0.289] 0.224 [0.284] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.:

"w
N
lab;fw
I
0.104 [0.061] 0.128 [0.054] 0.305 [0.450] 1.000 [1.000]
Account.:

"w
N
acc
I
0.281 [-0.093] 0.262 [-0.102] -0.014 [0.012] 0.028 [0.151] 1.000 [1.000]
Account.:
g
"w
N
acc
I
0.267 [-0.116] 0.271 [-0.119] -0.031 [0.009] 0.093 [0.186] 0.968[0.953] 1.000 [1.000]
Lesters range
of wages
L
prod
I
eLprodI Llab;wwI Llab;fwI LaccI eLaccI
Prod.: L
prod
I 1.000 [1.000]
Prod.: eLprodI 0.999[0.999] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: Llab;wwI 0.201 [0.310
] 0.192 [0.313] 1.000 [1.000]
Labor ec.: Llab;fwI 0.421
[0.032] 0.415[0.031] 0.304 [0.354] 1.000 [1.000]
Account.: L
acc
I 0.528
[0.051] 0.523[0.033] 0.327 [0.189] 0.278 [0.154] 1.000 [1.000]
Account.: eLaccI 0.448[0.070] 0.444[0.055] 0.315 [0.184] 0.268 [0.163] 0.990[0.989] 1.000 [1.000]
Notes: See Tables 2-4 for the formulas. Rank correlation is reported. A robust correlation is reported in square brackets.
Signicant at 1%, signicant at 5%, signicant at 10%.
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Graph 1: Relative and absolute extent of rent sharing parameters, wage-prot elasticities and
Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing by approach in R = IC-EB - variant 1
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Graph 2: Relative and absolute extent of rent sharing parameters, wage-prot elasticities and
Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing by approach in R = IC-EB - variant 2
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2b: Absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters by approach
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2c: Wage-profit elasticities by approach
profelas_prod (v2) profelas_labww
profelas_labfw profelas_acc (v2)
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
Source: Tables 2-4 (25 industries)
2d: Lester's range of wages due to rent sharing by approach
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Appendix A: Classication procedure
Classication procedure :
Hypothesis test
Null hypothesis
not rejected
H10:

I 1 =(
"QM)I
(M )I
 1

 0:10 and
H20:

 I=
("QM)I
(M )I
  ("
Q
N)I
(N )I

 j0:10j
R = PC-PR
H10:

I 1 =(
"QM)I
(M )I
 1

> 0:10 and
H20:

 I=
("QM)I
(M )I
  ("
Q
N)I
(N )I

 j0:10j
R = IC-PR
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Appendix B : Statistical annex
Table B.1: Panel structure of rm data: Number of participations
TOTAL SAMPLE (1981-2001) ESTIMATION SAMPLE (1984-2001) REGIME R = IC-EB (1981-2001) REGIME R = IC-EB (1984-2001)
# of participationsa) # obs % # rms % # obs % # rms % # obs % # rms % # obs % # rms %
1 5 0.00 5 0.05
2 10 0.01 5 0.03 12 0.01 6 0.06
3 234 0.14 78 0.52 171 0.16 57 0.58
4 744 0.43 186 1.25 1,136 0.69 284 1.90 442 0.39 111 1.13 732 0.67 183 1.86
5 1,900 1.11 380 2.55 2,425 1.47 485 3.25 1,241 1.10 249 2.53 1,585 1.45 317 3.22
6 6,984 4.07 1,164 7,80 7,308 4.42 1,218 8.16 4,522 4.00 754 7.66 4,656 4.26 776 7.88
7 8,197 4.78 1,171 7.85 826 5.00 1,180 7.91 5,314 4.70 762 7.74 5,390 4.94 770 7.82
8 9,672 5.64 1,209 8.10 9,424 5.70 1,178 7.89 6,381 5.65 801 8.13 6,256 5.73 782 7.94
9 11,403 6.65 1,267 8.49 11,367 6.88 1,263 8.46 7,507 6.64 837 8.50 7,425 6.80 825 8.38
10 12,210 7.12 1,221 8.18 1,213 7.34 1,213 8.13 8,350 7.39 837 8.50 8,370 7.66 837 8.50
11 12,419 7.24 1,129 7.57 12,793 7.74 1,163 7.79 8,052 7.12 732 7.43 8,162 7.47 742 7.53
12 13,416 7.82 1,118 7.49 13,428 8.12 1,119 7.50 9,055 8.01 755 7.67 9,096 8.33 758 7.70
13 13,897 8.10 1,069 7.16 14,053 8.50 1,081 7.24 9,295 8.22 715 7.26 9,321 8.54 717 7.28
14 14,210 8.28 1,015 6.80 14,154 8.56 1,011 6.78 9,255 8.19 662 6.72 9,100 8.33 650 6.60
15 14,175 8.26 945 6.33 14,085 8.52 939 6.29 9,381 8.30 627 6.37 9,390 8.60 626 6.36
16 31,296 18.24 1,956 13.11 31,648 19.14 1,978 13.26 21,752 19.25 1,360 13.81 21,760 19.93 1360 13.81
17 3,502 2.04 206 1.38 3,536 2.14 208 1.39 1,955 1.73 115 1.17 1,972 1.81 116 1.18
18 3,294 1.92 183 1.23 9,324 5.64 518 3.47 2,016 1.78 112 1.14 5,796 5.31 322 3.27
19 3,477 2.03 183 1.23 2,166 1.92 114 1.16
20 2,980 1.74 149 1.00 1,720 1.52 86 0.87
21 7,770 4.53 370 2.48 4,620 4.09 220 2.23
Total 171,546 100.0 14,921 100.0 165,315 100.0 14,921 100.0 113,024 100.0 9,849 100.0 109,199 100.0 9,849 100.0
Note: a) Median number of observations per rm in all samples: 11.
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Table B.2: Industry repartition in estimation sample
Ind. I Code Name
# rms
(# obs)
%
rms
# workers
(# obs)
%
workers
Regime R
1 B01 M ea t p r e p a r a t io n s 461 (4,956) 3.09 3,286 (18,339) 3.16 PC-MO
2 B02 M ilk p r o d u c t s 150 (1,764) 1.01 1,556 (9,458) 1.50 PC-MO
3 B03 B e v e r a g e s 155 (1,663) 1.04 1,422 (7,163) 1.37 PC-MO
4 B04 Fo o d p r o d u c t io n fo r a n im a l s 182 (2,043) 1.22 1,024 (5,671) 0.98 PC-MO
5 B05-B06 O th e r f o o d p r o d u c t s 767 (8,346) 5.14 5,095 (29,986) 4.90 IC-EB
6 C11 C lo t h in g a n d s k in g o o d s 790 (7,665) 5.29 4,245 (23,999) 4.08 IC-EB
7 C12 L e a t h e r g o o d s a n d fo o tw e a r 312 (3,422) 2.09 1,876 (12,555) 1.80 IC-EB
8 C20 P u b l i s h in g , ( r e ) p r in t in g 1,037 (10,936) 6.95 5,367 (31,459) 5.16 IC-EB
9 C31 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l p r o d u c t s 189 (1,990) 1.27 2,725 (15,391) 2.62 IC-MO
10 C32 S o a p , p e r fum e a n d m a in t e n a n c e p r o d u c t s 172 (1,865) 1.15 1,976 (10,861) 1.90 IC-PR
11 C41 Fu rn i t u r e 505 (5,658) 3.38 3,173 (20,979) 3.05 IC-EB
12 C42 J ew e l r y a n d m u s ic a l in s t r um e n t s 69 (816) 0.46 429 (3,001) 0.41 IC-PR
13 C43 S p o r t a r t i c l e s , g am e s a n d o t h e r p r o d u c t s 216 (2,379) 1.45 1,342 (8,388) 1.29 IC-PR
14 C44 D om e s t i c a p p l i c a n c e s 50 (619) 0.34 1,042 (7,813) 1.00 IC-PR
15 C45-C46 R e c e p t io n , r e c o r d in g , r e p r o d u c t io n . p h o t o g r a p h ic 129 (1,376) 0.86 1,149 (7,168) 1.10 IC-PR
e q u ipm e n t , o p t i c a l in s t r um e n t s , w a t ch e s
16 D01 M o to r v e h ic l e s 182 (2,023) 1.22 1,461 (9,003) 1.40 IC-MO
17 D02 Tra n s p o r t e q u ipm e n t 170 (2,078) 1.14 2,926 (18,740) 2.81 IC-PR
18 E11-E12, E14 S h ip b u i ld in g , c o n s t r u c t io n o f r a i lw ay r o l l in g s t o ck , 96 (996) 0.64 808 (5,099) 0.78 IC-EB
b ic y c l e s , m o t o r c y c l e s , t r a n s p o r t e q u ipm e n t n .e . c .
19 E13 A ir c r a f t a n d s p a c e c r a f t 63 (658) 0.42 1,923 (11,917) 1.85 IC-EB
20 E21 M e ta l p r o d u c t s f o r c o n s t r u c t io n 216 (2,360) 1.45 1,040 (6,425) 0.10 IC-EB
21 E22 Fe r r u g in o u s a n d s t e am b o i l e r s 398 (4,365) 2.67 1,965 (12,118) 1.89 IC-EB
22 E23 M ech a n ic a l e q u ipm e n t 235 (2,783) 1.57 2,427 (17,332) 2.33 IC-PR
23 E24 M a ch in e r y fo r g e n e r a l u s a g e 379 (3,962) 2.54 3,003 (18,532) 2.89 PC-MO
24 E25 A g r ic u l t u r a l m a ch in e r y 118 (1,288) 0.79 618 (3,705) 0.59 PC-MO
25 E26 M a ch in e t o o l s 84 (932) 0.56 539 (3,466) 0.52 IC-PR
26 E27-E28 O th e r s p e c ia l p u rp o s e m a ch in e r y 361 (3,990) 2.42 2,027 (13,832) 1.95 IC-EB
27 E31-E32 O ¢ c e m a ch in e r y a n d c om p u t e r s , e n g in e s , 96 (840) 0.64 804 (4,299) 0.77 PC-MO
g e n e r a t o r s a n d t r a n s f o rm e r s
28 E33 Te le v i s i o n a n d r a d io t r a n sm it t e r s 66 (547) 0.44 348 (1,468) 0.33 PC-MO
29 F34 M ed ic a l a n d s u r g i c a l e q u ipm e n t a n d o r t h o p a e d ic a p p l ia n c e s 96 (941) 0.64 489 (2,629) 0.47 IC-EB
30 E35 In s t r um e n t s a n d a p p l ia n c e s f o r m e a s u r in g a n d ch e ck in g 153 (1,357) 1.03 715 (3,582) 0.69 PC-MO
31 F11-F12 M in in g o f m e t a l o r e s , o t h e r m in in g n .e . c . 237 (2,883) 1.59 973 (6,024) 0.94 IC-EB
32 F13 G la s s p r o d u c t s 141 (1,611) 0.94 1,896 (13,058) 1.82 PC-EB
33 F14 E a r t h e nw a r e p r o d u c t s a n d c o n s t r u c t io n m a t e r ia l 528 (6,109) 3.54 3,586 (22,679) 3.45 IC-EB
34 F21 S p in n in g a n d w e av in g 374 (4,014) 2.51 2,748 (16,415) 2.64 IC-EB
35 F22 Te x t i l e p r o d u c t s 301 (3,434) 2.02 1,816 (11,636) 1.75 IC-PR
36 F23 K n it t e d a n d c r o ch e t e d fa b r i c s 126 (1,313) 0.84 1,341 (8,391) 1.29 IC-EB
37 F31 Wo o d e n p r o d u c t s 591 (6,882) 3.96 2,222 (14,274) 2.14 PC-MO
38 F32 P u lp , p a p e r a n d p a p e r b o a rd 82 (935) 0.55 1,007 (6,979) 0.97 IC-EB
39 F33 A r t i c l e s o f p a p e r a n d p a p e r b o a rd 362 (4,358) 2.43 2,633 (18,624) 2.53 IC-EB
40 F41 In o r g a n ic b a s i c ch em ic a l s 64 (726) 0.43 695 (3,894) 0.67 PC-MO
41 F42 O rg a n ic b a s i c ch em ic a l s 92 (1,010) 0.62 990 (6,379) 0.95 PC-MO
42 F43 P a r a ch em ic a l p r o d u c t s 237 (2,730) 1.59 2,210 (13,253) 0.21 PC-MO
43 F45 R u b b e r p r o d u c t s 123 (1,488) 0.82 1,403 (9,866) 1.35 IC-EB
44 F46 P la s t i c p r o d u c t s 877 (10,010) 5.88 4,899 (32,192) 4.71 IC-EB
45 F51 B a s i c i r o n a n d s t e e l 102 (1,243) 0.68 1,806 (12,327) 1.74 IC-EB
46 F52 P ro d u c t io n o f n o n - f e r r o u s m e t a l s 67 (738) 0.45 923 (5,649) 0.89 IC-EB
47 F53 I r o nw a r e 188 (2,253) 1.26 1,394 (10,165) 1.34 IC-EB
48 F54 In d u s t r ia l s e r v i c e t o m e t a l p r o d u c t s 1,301 (14,949) 8.72 4,620 (9,970) 0.44 IC-EB
49 F55 M e ta l f a b r i c a t io n 663 (8,024) 4.44 3,748 (26,112) 3.60 IC-EB
50 F56 R e c y c l in g 84 (908) 0.56 294 (1,643) 0.28 PC-PR
51 F61 E le c t r i c a l e q u ipm e n t 325 (3,534) 2.18 4,839 (28,871) 4.65 PC-PR
52 F62 E le c t r o n ic s 159 (1,545) 1.07 1,152 (6,110) 1.11 IC-EB
Total 14,921 (165,315) 100.0 103,995 (648,889) 100.0
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Table B.3: Industry classication
# ind.
prop. of ind. (%)
prop. of rms (%)
prop. of emp. (%)
LABOR MARKET SETTING
PRODUCT MARKET
SETTING
Perfect competition
or right-to-manage
bargaining (PR)
E¢ cient
bargaining (EB)
Monopsony (MO)
Perfect competition (PC )
2
3:8
2:7
5:2
1
1:9
0:9
1:7
13
25:0
18:4
18:3
16
30:7
22:0
25:2
Imperfect competition (IC )
9
17:3
9:5
12:6
25
48:1
65:9
57:6
2
3:8
2:5
4:5
36
69:2
77:9
74:7
11
21:1
12:2
17:8
26
50:0
66:8
59:3
15
28:8
20:9
22:8
52
100
100
100
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Table B.4: Panel structure of matched worker-rm data: Number of participations
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (1984-2001) REGIME R = IC-EB (1984-2001)
# of participationsa) # obs % # workers % # obs % # workers %
2 28,720 4.43 15,203 14.62 15,872 4.15 8,393 13.92
3 37,845 5.83 13,374 12.86 20,447 5.35 7,243 12.01
4 51,734 7.97 13,606 13.08 29,114 7.61 7,687 12.75
5 42,736 6.59 9,045 8.70 24,721 6.46 5,236 8.68
6 60,092 9.26 10,477 10.07 36,747 9.61 6,406 10.62
7 47,907 7.38 7,164 6.89 27,911 7.30 4,187 6.94
8 46,969 7.24 6,145 5.91 28,760 7.52 3,775 6.26
9 49,047 7.56 5,687 5.47 29,444 7.70 3,417 5.67
10 49,602 7.64 5,149 4.95 29,104 7.61 3,016 5.00
11 53,540 8.25 5,021 4.83 33,995 8.89 3,188 5.29
12 30,471 4.70 2,634 2.53 18,869 4.93 1,629 2.70
13 31,753 4.89 2,534 2.44 18,055 4.72 1,445 2.40
14 30,413 4.69 2,242 2.16 17,638 4.61 1,302 2.16
15 40,260 6.20 2,759 2.65 24,335 6.36 1,673 2.77
16 17,895 2.76 1,148 1.10 8,969 2.34 577 0.96
17 29,905 4.61 1,807 1.74 18,520 4.84 1,120 1.86
Total 648,889 100.0 103,995 100.0 382,501 100.0 60,294 100.0
Note: a) Median number of observations per worker in both samples: 5.
43
Table B.5: Productivity approach: Industry-specic input shares (J )I (J = N;M;K), output elasticities
b"QJ I , scale elasticity bI , joint market imperfections parameter b I ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up bI and absolute extent of rent sharing bI or labor supply elasticity  b"Nw I by regime
Regime R = IC-EB [48% of industries, 66% of rms, 58% of employment]
Ind. I (N )I (M )I (K )I (b"QN )I (b"QM )I (b"QK )I bI b I bI bprodI bprodI Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
3 9 0 .2 4 9 0 .5 3 8 0 .2 1 2 0 .2 5 1 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) 0 .6 0 2 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) 0 .1 0 9 ( 0 .0 6 3 ) 0 .9 6 2 ( 0 .0 1 1 ) 0 .1 0 9 ( 0 .1 9 2 ) 1 .1 1 8 ( 0 .0 6 6 ) 0 .1 1 5 ( 0 .1 9 6 ) 0 .1 0 3 ( 0 .1 5 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 5 7 0 .1 0 8 0 .5 8 0 0 .5 7 1 - 3 .8 7 - 6 .8 4
4 4 0 .2 6 9 0 .5 5 8 0 .1 7 4 0 .2 8 0 ( 0 .0 2 1 ) 0 .6 3 9 ( 0 .0 2 0 ) 0 .0 7 0 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) 0 .9 8 9 ( 0 .0 0 9 ) 0 .1 0 4 ( 0 .1 0 5 ) 1 .1 4 6 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .1 4 1 ( 0 .1 3 8 ) 0 .1 2 4 ( 0 .1 0 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 2 5 0 .5 4 0 0 .1 3 0 0 .4 3 0 - 1 .5 3 - 1 2 .2 3
2 0 0 .2 7 6 0 .5 9 3 0 .1 3 1 0 .2 8 1 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .6 7 0 ( 0 .0 3 9 ) 0 .0 0 5 ( 0 .0 6 9 ) 0 .9 5 5 ( 0 .0 2 0 ) 0 .1 1 2 ( 0 .2 0 4 ) 1 .1 2 9 ( 0 .0 6 6 ) 0 .2 1 0 ( 0 .3 7 2 ) 0 .1 7 3 ( 0 .2 5 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .8 7 7 1 .0 0 0 0 .8 5 2 0 .6 5 5 - 1 .2 7 - 7 .1 1
3 3 0 .2 9 0 0 .4 8 5 0 .2 2 5 0 .2 9 4 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .6 0 0 ( 0 .0 2 4 ) 0 .0 8 2 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .9 7 5 ( 0 .0 1 4 ) 0 .2 2 2 ( 0 .1 3 1 ) 1 .2 3 6 ( 0 .0 5 0 ) 0 .2 3 1 ( 0 .1 2 9 ) 0 .1 8 8 ( 0 .0 8 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 6 5 0 .5 4 3 0 .3 7 8 0 .6 0 0 - 1 .0 5 - 9 .4 0
8 0 .3 3 6 0 .4 8 3 0 .1 8 1 0 .3 4 4 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .5 7 1 ( 0 .0 2 0 ) 0 .0 7 5 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .9 8 9 ( 0 .0 0 9 ) 0 .1 6 2 ( 0 .1 0 5 ) 1 .1 8 3 ( 0 .0 4 2 ) 0 .2 5 5 ( 0 .1 5 7 ) 0 .2 0 3 ( 0 .0 9 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 3 8 0 .3 0 6 0 .3 4 8 0 .2 0 0 - 2 .0 8 - 1 2 .9 5
3 1 0 .2 6 7 0 .5 0 2 0 .2 3 1 0 .2 5 4 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .6 3 4 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .1 1 9 ( 0 .0 4 7 ) 1 .0 0 7 ( 0 .0 1 0 ) 0 .3 1 3 ( 0 .1 3 7 ) 1 .2 6 4 ( 0 .0 5 6 ) 0 .2 8 6 ( 0 .1 1 5 ) 0 .2 2 3 ( 0 .0 6 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .7 1 4 0 .8 3 0 0 .9 9 2 0 .9 9 7 - 0 .5 2 - 7 .3 8
4 6 0 .1 9 1 0 .6 1 2 0 .1 9 7 0 .1 5 4 ( 0 .0 5 8 ) 0 .7 0 7 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .0 9 8 ( 0 .0 8 0 ) 0 .9 5 9 ( 0 .0 3 3 ) 0 .3 4 6 ( 0 .3 4 5 ) 1 .1 5 4 ( 0 .0 7 3 ) 0 .2 9 1 ( 0 .2 7 9 ) 0 .2 2 5 ( 0 .1 6 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 0 .1 2 - 3 .6 1
3 8 0 .2 0 4 0 .5 9 9 0 .1 9 7 0 .1 7 9 ( 0 .0 7 7 ) 0 .7 5 8 ( 0 .0 5 6 ) 0 .0 4 2 ( 0 .1 2 5 ) 0 .9 7 9 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .3 8 7 ( 0 .4 6 0 ) 1 .2 6 5 ( 0 .0 9 3 ) 0 .3 1 6 ( 0 .3 5 4 ) 0 .2 4 0 ( 0 .2 0 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .2 3 - 3 .5 3
2 9 0 .3 9 5 0 .3 7 0 0 .2 3 5 0 .4 7 6 ( 0 .1 4 3 ) 0 .5 5 0 ( 0 .0 8 0 ) 0 .0 3 0 ( 0 .2 0 0 ) 1 .0 5 5 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .2 8 0 ( 0 .5 4 8 ) 1 .4 8 5 ( 0 .2 1 5 ) 0 .3 1 7 ( 0 .5 7 8 ) 0 .2 4 1 ( 0 .3 3 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .9 9 6 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 .5 9 - 3 .2 5
4 5 0 .2 3 0 0 .5 9 8 0 .1 7 2 0 .2 0 0 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .6 8 3 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .0 7 0 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .9 5 3 ( 0 .0 1 7 ) 0 .2 7 2 ( 0 .1 9 6 ) 1 .1 4 2 ( 0 .0 7 4 ) 0 .3 1 9 ( 0 .2 2 0 ) 0 .2 4 2 ( 0 .1 2 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 .6 7 - 4 .6 5
5 0 .2 8 2 0 .5 3 5 0 .1 8 4 0 .2 4 6 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .6 1 5 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .1 3 9 ( 0 .0 4 2 ) 1 .0 0 0 ( 0 .0 1 3 ) 0 .2 7 7 ( 0 .1 2 0 ) 1 .1 5 0 ( 0 .0 4 3 ) 0 .3 6 9 ( 0 .1 5 0 ) 0 .2 6 9 ( 0 .0 8 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .2 4 2 0 .8 5 4 0 .6 7 7 0 .6 4 4 - 1 .5 7 - 9 .0 5
7 0 .3 3 7 0 .4 8 7 0 .1 7 7 0 .3 1 3 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .5 6 2 ( 0 .0 3 9 ) 0 .0 8 5 ( 0 .0 7 1 ) 0 .9 6 0 ( 0 .0 1 5 ) 0 .2 2 6 ( 0 .1 8 2 ) 1 .1 5 5 ( 0 .0 8 0 ) 0 .3 7 3 ( 0 .2 7 8 ) 0 .2 7 2 ( 0 .1 4 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .2 0 8 0 .4 9 6 0 .8 4 0 0 .7 4 5 - 0 .5 4 - 6 .9 3
4 3 0 .3 3 1 0 .4 9 1 0 .1 7 8 0 .3 1 1 ( 0 .0 5 8 ) 0 .5 9 1 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .0 7 8 ( 0 .0 8 2 ) 0 .9 8 0 ( 0 .0 2 2 ) 0 .2 6 6 ( 0 .2 3 7 ) 1 .2 0 5 ( 0 .1 0 6 ) 0 .4 1 1 ( 0 .3 4 1 ) 0 .2 9 1 ( 0 .1 7 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .4 7 - 4 .6 7
1 8 0 .3 2 3 0 .5 2 1 0 .1 5 6 0 .2 9 4 ( 0 .0 6 4 ) 0 .5 9 6 ( 0 .0 7 1 ) 0 .0 6 3 ( 0 .1 1 9 ) 0 .9 5 3 ( 0 .0 2 1 ) 0 .2 3 2 ( 0 .3 1 0 ) 1 .1 4 3 ( 0 .1 3 7 ) 0 .4 2 1 ( 0 .5 1 9 ) 0 .2 9 6 ( 0 .2 5 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 .5 4 - 4 .4 2
1 9 0 .3 8 4 0 .4 5 6 0 .1 6 1 0 .3 9 5 ( 0 .0 9 9 ) 0 .5 8 3 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .0 1 0 ( 0 .1 2 7 ) 0 .9 8 8 ( 0 .0 2 7 ) 0 .2 5 1 ( 0 .3 2 4 ) 1 .2 7 9 ( 0 .1 1 4 ) 0 .4 6 9 ( 0 .5 7 7 ) 0 .3 1 9 ( 0 .2 6 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .1 8 - 3 .6 6
1 1 0 .3 0 9 0 .5 3 2 0 .1 5 9 0 .2 9 6 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .6 7 5 ( 0 .0 3 0 ) 0 .0 1 0 ( 0 .0 5 9 ) 0 .9 8 0 ( 0 .0 1 2 ) 0 .3 1 1 ( 0 .1 6 2 ) 1 .2 6 8 ( 0 .0 5 7 ) 0 .4 7 8 ( 0 .2 3 1 ) 0 .3 2 3 ( 0 .1 0 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 4 5 0 .0 5 2 0 .0 7 3 0 .4 0 2 - 2 .6 7 - 1 0 .2 8
5 2 0 .3 6 4 0 .4 7 3 0 .1 6 3 0 .3 3 4 ( 0 .0 4 9 ) 0 .5 5 3 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .1 0 1 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .9 8 8 ( 0 .0 2 4 ) 0 .2 5 2 ( 0 .1 6 5 ) 1 .1 6 9 ( 0 .0 5 9 ) 0 .4 7 9 ( 0 .3 0 0 ) 0 .3 2 4 ( 0 .1 3 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .9 2 3 0 .8 9 8 0 .9 2 9 0 .9 9 1 - 1 .9 6 - 3 .8 0
4 7 0 .3 3 7 0 .5 0 0 0 .1 6 3 0 .3 3 0 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .6 3 9 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .0 0 5 ( 0 .0 5 3 ) 0 .9 7 5 ( 0 .0 1 1 ) 0 .2 9 8 ( 0 .1 4 5 ) 1 .2 7 8 ( 0 .0 4 9 ) 0 .4 8 2 ( 0 .2 2 0 ) 0 .3 2 5 ( 0 .1 0 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .4 3 0 0 .6 5 1 0 .2 8 4 0 .8 7 4 - 1 .3 4 - 7 .4 1
2 6 0 .3 6 0 0 .4 8 9 0 .1 5 1 0 .3 2 7 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .5 7 7 ( 0 .0 4 2 ) 0 .0 8 2 ( 0 .0 8 8 ) 0 .9 8 5 ( 0 .0 1 7 ) 0 .2 7 3 ( 0 .2 1 9 ) 1 .1 8 0 ( 0 .0 8 6 ) 0 .5 5 0 ( 0 .4 0 5 ) 0 .3 5 5 ( 0 .1 6 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 1 8 0 .0 9 8 0 .0 4 8 0 .3 2 3 0 .0 5 - 9 .0 1
2 1 0 .4 0 1 0 .4 7 9 0 .1 2 0 0 .4 0 4 ( 0 .0 3 1 ) 0 .5 8 9 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .0 2 0 ( 0 .0 4 8 ) 1 .0 1 3 ( 0 .0 1 3 ) 0 .2 2 0 ( 0 .1 1 5 ) 1 .2 2 9 ( 0 .0 4 7 ) 0 .5 9 9 ( 0 .2 9 2 ) 0 .3 7 4 ( 0 .1 1 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 3 5 0 .3 1 6 0 .1 9 4 0 .3 7 8 - 0 .6 6 - 8 .9 9
3 6 0 .3 6 7 0 .4 8 6 0 .1 4 8 0 .3 0 5 ( 0 .0 3 9 ) 0 .5 4 9 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .0 9 9 ( 0 .0 6 8 ) 0 .9 5 3 ( 0 .0 1 9 ) 0 .3 0 0 ( 0 .1 6 4 ) 1 .1 3 1 ( 0 .0 8 2 ) 0 .6 5 7 ( 0 .3 2 1 ) 0 .3 9 7 ( 0 .1 1 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .0 3 - 5 .0 8
4 9 0 .3 2 6 0 .4 6 0 0 .2 1 3 0 .2 5 5 ( 0 .0 3 3 ) 0 .6 4 9 ( 0 .0 2 9 ) 0 .0 7 2 ( 0 .0 5 6 ) 0 .9 7 6 ( 0 .0 1 3 ) 0 .6 3 1 ( 0 .1 5 3 ) 1 .4 1 0 ( 0 .0 6 3 ) 0 .6 8 5 ( 0 .1 4 0 ) 0 .4 0 6 ( 0 .0 4 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 1 5 0 .2 2 2 0 .4 9 7 0 .7 8 6 - 2 .2 5 - 1 2 .5 2
3 4 0 .3 1 8 0 .5 2 7 0 .1 5 6 0 .2 4 2 ( 0 .0 4 2 ) 0 .6 6 5 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .0 2 3 ( 0 .0 6 5 ) 0 .9 3 1 ( 0 .0 1 3 ) 0 .5 0 2 ( 0 .1 7 7 ) 1 .2 6 4 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .8 0 9 ( 0 .2 5 6 ) 0 .4 4 7 ( 0 .0 7 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 9 9 0 .5 2 8 0 .8 1 1 0 .9 8 6 - 2 .6 2 - 7 .1 1
4 8 0 .3 7 6 0 .4 5 4 0 .1 7 0 0 .3 1 0 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .5 9 2 ( 0 .0 1 8 ) 0 .0 5 5 ( 0 .0 3 9 ) 0 .9 5 7 ( 0 .0 0 9 ) 0 .4 7 8 ( 0 .1 0 0 ) 1 .3 0 4 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .8 1 0 ( 0 .1 4 7 ) 0 .4 4 7 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 2 8 0 .3 2 9 0 .0 8 0 - 3 .1 7 - 1 8 .0 3
6 0 .4 4 2 0 .3 9 9 0 .1 5 9 0 .3 3 2 ( 0 .0 3 9 ) 0 .5 0 5 ( 0 .0 1 9 ) 0 .1 0 0 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .9 3 6 ( 0 .0 1 8 ) 0 .5 1 5 ( 0 .1 1 4 ) 1 .2 6 5 ( 0 .0 4 7 ) 1 .1 3 0 ( 0 .2 2 3 ) 0 .5 3 1 ( 0 .0 4 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 3 4 0 .4 1 5 0 .6 9 8 - 3 .0 6 - 1 0 .1 2
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Table B.5 - Continued: Productivity approach: Industry-specic input shares (J )I (J = N;M;K), output elasticities
b"QJ I , scale elasticity bI , joint market imperfections parameter b I , and
corresponding price-cost mark-up bI and absolute extent of rent sharing bI or labor supply elasticity  b"Nw I by regime
Regime R = PC-MO [25% of industries, 18% of rms, 18% of employment]
Ind. I (N )I (M )I (K )I (b"QN )I (b"QM )I (b"QK )I bI b I bI bI (b"Nw )I Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
2 8 0 .3 5 2 0 .4 0 5 0 .2 4 2 0 .6 9 8 ( 0 .1 0 9 ) 0 .3 4 5 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .0 0 2 ( 0 .0 9 7 ) 1 .0 4 5 ( 0 .0 6 9 ) - 1 .1 2 9 ( 0 .3 6 1 ) 0 .8 5 0 ( 0 .1 0 9 ) 0 .4 3 0 ( 0 .1 0 0 ) 0 .7 5 4 ( 0 .3 0 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .2 4 - 2 .0 6
3 0 0 .3 3 8 0 .4 3 7 0 .2 2 5 0 .5 3 1 ( 0 .1 0 5 ) 0 .3 9 9 ( 0 .0 6 5 ) 0 .0 9 5 ( 0 .1 2 5 ) 1 .0 2 5 ( 0 .0 5 6 ) - 0 .6 5 9 ( 0 .3 9 6 ) 0 .9 1 2 ( 0 .1 4 8 ) 0 .5 8 1 ( 0 .1 7 6 ) 1 .3 8 5 ( 1 .0 0 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .3 4 1 0 .4 4 9 0 .3 5 0 0 .6 9 5 - 4 .5 7 - 1 .4 8
2 4 0 .2 6 7 0 .5 7 4 0 .1 5 9 0 .3 7 0 ( 0 .0 8 6 ) 0 .5 1 0 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .0 6 9 ( 0 .1 2 8 ) 0 .9 4 9 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) - 0 .4 9 5 ( 0 .4 0 0 ) 0 .8 8 8 ( 0 .0 9 4 ) 0 .6 4 2 ( 0 .2 0 7 ) 1 .7 9 2 ( 1 .6 1 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 3 .5 4 0 .1 1
1 0 .2 0 6 0 .6 2 6 0 .1 6 8 0 .3 1 6 ( 0 .0 3 2 ) 0 .6 1 9 ( 0 .0 2 9 ) 0 .0 4 1 ( 0 .0 5 5 ) 0 .9 7 6 ( 0 .0 1 4 ) - 0 .5 4 9 ( 0 .1 8 8 ) 0 .9 8 9 ( 0 .0 4 6 ) 0 .6 4 3 ( 0 .0 8 7 ) 1 .8 0 2 ( 0 .6 8 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .2 4 3 0 .6 1 6 0 .6 1 1 0 .4 9 2 - 7 .6 9 - 1 .9 4
3 0 .1 7 8 0 .6 0 0 0 .2 2 2 0 .2 9 2 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .6 3 4 ( 0 .0 3 1 ) 0 .0 8 8 ( 0 .0 6 1 ) 1 .0 1 4 ( 0 .0 2 1 ) - 0 .5 7 9 ( 0 .2 7 8 ) 1 .0 5 8 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .6 4 6 ( 0 .1 1 8 ) 1 .8 2 9 ( 0 .9 4 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .9 7 8 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 4 .4 9 - 2 .1 8
4 0 0 .1 9 6 0 .5 6 5 0 .2 3 9 0 .3 1 2 ( 0 .1 4 6 ) 0 .5 9 3 ( 0 .0 9 1 ) 0 .0 8 9 ( 0 .2 1 4 ) 0 .9 9 4 ( 0 .0 5 7 ) - 0 .5 4 6 ( 0 .8 8 2 ) 1 .0 5 0 ( 0 .1 6 0 ) 0 .6 5 8 ( 0 .3 9 4 ) 1 .9 2 3 ( 3 .3 6 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .9 1 - 1 .6 8
2 3 0 .3 0 5 0 .5 2 9 0 .1 6 6 0 .4 7 0 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .5 3 9 ( 0 .0 3 4 ) - 0 .0 2 8 ( 0 .0 7 4 ) 0 .9 8 0 ( 0 .0 1 4 ) - 0 .5 2 2 ( 0 .2 0 3 ) 1 .0 1 9 ( 0 .0 6 4 ) 0 .6 6 1 ( 0 .1 0 0 ) 1 .9 5 3 ( 0 .8 7 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .3 2 7 0 .6 6 8 0 .9 2 9 0 .9 7 0 - 7 .4 2 - 0 .6 6
4 2 0 .2 3 6 0 .5 6 2 0 .2 0 2 0 .3 6 0 ( 0 .0 4 2 ) 0 .5 8 9 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .0 5 8 ( 0 .0 7 2 ) 1 .0 0 8 ( 0 .0 1 7 ) - 0 .4 7 7 ( 0 .2 3 1 ) 1 .0 4 8 ( 0 .0 7 0 ) 0 .6 8 7 ( 0 .1 1 6 ) 2 .1 9 6 ( 1 .1 8 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .3 0 4 0 .9 2 6 0 .4 0 0 0 .5 1 8 - 5 .7 5 - 2 .7 7
4 1 0 .1 9 4 0 .6 3 1 0 .1 7 5 0 .2 8 5 ( 0 .0 7 2 ) 0 .6 9 0 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) 0 .0 5 4 ( 0 .0 9 1 ) 1 .0 2 9 ( 0 .0 2 2 ) - 0 .3 7 8 ( 0 .4 1 1 ) 1 .0 9 3 ( 0 .0 5 5 ) 0 .7 4 3 ( 0 .2 1 5 ) 2 .8 8 8 ( 3 .2 4 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 3 .7 0 - 2 .0 3
2 7 0 .3 1 8 0 .4 7 4 0 .2 0 8 0 .4 1 9 ( 0 .0 5 3 ) 0 .4 6 7 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .0 5 6 ( 0 .0 8 2 ) 0 .9 4 1 ( 0 .0 4 6 ) - 0 .3 3 0 ( 0 .2 2 9 ) 0 .9 8 5 ( 0 .0 9 3 ) 0 .7 4 9 ( 0 .1 4 4 ) 2 .9 8 3 ( 2 .2 9 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .5 4 0 .5 1
4 0 .1 1 9 0 .6 9 2 0 .1 8 9 0 .1 7 0 ( 0 .0 3 4 ) 0 .7 4 8 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .0 4 9 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .9 6 7 ( 0 .0 2 2 ) - 0 .3 5 5 ( 0 .3 0 4 ) 1 .0 8 1 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .7 5 3 ( 0 .1 6 3 ) 3 .0 4 2 ( 2 .6 6 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .5 9 5 0 .9 8 6 0 .9 8 8 0 .8 8 0 - 1 .2 4 - 2 .5 8
3 7 0 .2 5 9 0 .5 4 5 0 .1 9 6 0 .3 4 4 ( 0 .0 3 8 ) 0 .5 9 5 ( 0 .0 3 0 ) 0 .0 5 9 ( 0 .0 6 1 ) 0 .9 9 8 ( 0 .0 1 4 ) - 0 .2 3 6 ( 0 .1 9 1 ) 1 .0 9 2 ( 0 .0 5 5 ) 0 .8 2 2 ( 0 .1 2 4 ) 4 .6 2 0 ( 3 .9 2 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .2 1 5 0 .4 9 0 0 .3 0 2 0 .1 2 6 - 1 0 .0 5 - 0 .6 3
2 0 .1 4 2 0 .7 0 8 0 .1 5 0 0 .1 7 7 ( 0 .0 3 6 ) 0 .7 5 2 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .0 4 6 ( 0 .0 5 3 ) 0 .9 7 5 ( 0 .0 1 6 ) - 0 .1 8 4 ( 0 .2 7 7 ) 1 .0 6 2 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) 0 .8 5 3 ( 0 .1 9 3 ) 5 .7 8 9 ( 8 .8 9 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .9 9 1 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 3 .6 4 - 0 .9 2
Regime R = IC-PR [17% of industries, 9% of rms, 13% of employment]
Ind. I (N )I (M )I (K )I (b"QN )I (b"QM )I (b"QK )I bI b I bI Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
2 5 0 .3 2 6 0 .5 1 8 0 .1 5 7 0 .3 4 9 ( 0 .0 9 0 ) 0 .5 7 0 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .0 8 0 ( 0 .1 1 0 ) 0 .9 9 9 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .0 2 9 ( 0 .3 4 2 ) 1 .1 0 0 ( 0 .1 0 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 5 .0 1 - 0 .3 9
3 5 0 .3 3 1 0 .5 0 4 0 .1 6 6 0 .3 5 4 ( 0 .0 3 8 ) 0 .5 5 9 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) 0 .0 5 7 ( 0 .0 6 5 ) 0 .9 6 9 ( 0 .0 1 8 ) 0 .0 4 0 ( 0 .1 6 6 ) 1 .1 0 9 ( 0 .0 6 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .5 9 6 0 .6 4 2 0 .7 7 2 0 .5 5 9 - 7 .0 9 - 1 .5 3
2 2 0 .3 2 8 0 .4 9 3 0 .1 7 9 0 .3 8 5 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .5 5 7 ( 0 .0 4 3 ) 0 .0 1 5 ( 0 .0 8 6 ) 0 .9 5 8 ( 0 .0 1 7 ) - 0 .0 4 6 ( 0 .2 3 1 ) 1 .1 3 0 ( 0 .0 8 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .3 0 6 0 .1 4 5 0 .3 0 4 0 .3 4 4 - 7 .9 8 0 .5 2
1 3 0 .3 2 0 0 .4 7 7 0 .2 0 2 0 .3 7 8 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .5 4 4 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .0 3 3 ( 0 .0 7 8 ) 0 .9 5 5 ( 0 .0 2 1 ) - 0 .0 3 9 ( 0 .2 2 7 ) 1 .1 4 0 ( 0 .0 8 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .4 7 2 0 .6 0 0 0 .5 6 8 0 .8 7 6 - 6 .9 4 1 .5 7
1 2 0 .3 4 7 0 .4 7 9 0 .1 7 4 0 .3 9 2 ( 0 .0 6 1 ) 0 .5 5 9 ( 0 .0 5 3 ) 0 .0 4 8 ( 0 .0 9 0 ) 0 .9 9 9 ( 0 .0 3 0 ) 0 .0 4 0 ( 0 .2 4 6 ) 1 .1 6 8 ( 0 .1 1 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 4 .9 0 0 .0 0
1 7 0 .2 5 6 0 .5 5 3 0 .1 9 1 0 .2 9 9 ( 0 .0 4 1 ) 0 .6 4 8 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .0 3 0 ( 0 .0 7 1 ) 0 .9 7 7 ( 0 .0 1 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 ( 0 .2 1 3 ) 1 .1 7 0 ( 0 .0 6 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .8 0 0 0 .9 9 6 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 5 .5 8 - 1 .3 7
1 0 0 .2 5 2 0 .5 5 2 0 .1 9 6 0 .2 9 7 ( 0 .0 5 0 ) 0 .6 7 2 ( 0 .0 3 9 ) 0 .0 1 8 ( 0 .0 7 8 ) 0 .9 8 7 ( 0 .0 1 5 ) 0 .0 3 9 ( 0 .2 5 1 ) 1 .2 1 7 ( 0 .0 7 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .7 6 0 0 .9 8 0 0 .9 5 9 0 .8 8 8 - 5 .0 8 - 1 .1 1
1 5 0 .3 4 1 0 .4 9 1 0 .1 6 8 0 .4 0 9 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .5 9 9 ( 0 .0 3 6 ) - 0 .0 3 2 ( 0 .0 6 2 ) 0 .9 7 5 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .0 2 2 ( 0 .1 7 8 ) 1 .2 2 1 ( 0 .0 7 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 4 .8 9 - 0 .9 9
1 4 0 .2 6 6 0 .5 3 8 0 .1 9 6 0 .3 1 7 ( 0 .1 1 0 ) 0 .6 8 3 ( 0 .0 7 0 ) - 0 .0 3 2 ( 0 .1 4 2 ) 0 .9 9 8 ( 0 .0 3 9 ) 0 .0 7 9 ( 0 .4 9 0 ) 1 .2 7 0 ( 0 .1 3 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .5 2 - 1 .4 5
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Table B.5 - Continued: Productivity approach: Industry-specic input shares (J )I (J = N;M;K), output elasticities
b"QJ I , scale elasticity bI , joint market imperfections parameter b I , and
corresponding price-cost mark-up bI and absolute extent of rent sharing bI or labor supply elasticity  b"Nw I by regime
Regime R = PC-PR [4% of industries, 3% of rms, 5% of employment]
Ind. I (N )I (M )I (K )I (b"QN )I (b"QM )I (b"QK )I bI b I bI Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
5 0 0 .2 3 3 0 .5 0 2 0 .2 6 5 0 .2 1 0 ( 0 .0 6 4 0 .4 8 9 ( 0 .0 6 2 ) 0 .1 5 9 ( 0 .0 9 7 ) 0 .8 5 7 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .0 7 4 ( 0 .3 2 4 ) 0 .9 7 4 ( 0 .1 2 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .5 0 - 2 .8 7
5 1 0 .3 0 7 0 .5 2 1 0 .1 7 2 0 .3 3 1 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .5 2 4 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .1 2 2 ( 0 .0 7 1 ) 0 .9 7 6 ( 0 .0 1 8 ) - 0 .0 7 5 ( 0 .2 0 0 ) 1 .0 0 4 ( 0 .0 7 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 9 4 0 .7 2 4 0 .8 2 4 0 .6 4 2 - 4 .9 4 - 1 .8 8
Regime R = IC-MO [4% of industries, 2% of rms, 4% of employment]
Ind. I (N )I (M )I (K )I (b"QN )I (b"QM )I (b"QK )I bI b I bI bI (b"Nw )I Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
1 6 0 .2 6 2 0 .5 7 4 0 .1 6 4 0 .3 5 3 ( 0 .0 6 6 ) 0 .6 3 3 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .0 1 4 ( 0 .1 0 3 ) 1 .0 0 1 ( 0 .0 1 9 ) - 0 .2 4 5 ( 0 .3 2 0 ) 1 .1 0 3 ( 0 .0 7 8 ) 0 .8 1 8 ( 0 .2 0 4 ) 4 .5 0 8 ( 6 .1 8 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .8 3 4 0 .7 5 0 0 .3 9 7 0 .6 3 5 - 6 .0 7 0 .8 5
9 0 .2 3 7 0 .5 5 8 0 .2 0 5 0 .3 5 2 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .7 0 7 ( 0 .0 2 6 ) - 0 .0 4 2 ( 0 .0 5 8 ) 1 .0 1 7 ( 0 .0 1 4 ) - 0 .2 1 7 ( 0 .2 0 0 ) 1 .2 6 7 ( 0 .0 4 6 ) 0 .8 5 4 ( 0 .1 1 8 ) 5 .8 2 7 ( 5 .5 2 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .3 5 7 0 .1 0 8 0 .2 6 7 0 .5 1 6 - 4 .9 6 - 0 .6 3
Regime R = PC-EB [2% of industries, 1% of rms, 2% of employment]
Ind. I (N )I (M )I (K )I (b"QN )I (b"QM )I (b"QK )I bI b I bI bI bI Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
3 2 0 .3 0 8 0 .4 8 8 0 .2 0 5 0 .2 4 6 ( 0 .0 5 0 ) 0 .4 7 5 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .2 0 8 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .9 2 9 ( 0 .0 2 6 ) 0 .1 7 7 ( 0 .1 7 4 ) 0 .9 7 5 ( 0 .0 7 6 ) 0 .2 7 2 ( 0 .2 6 0 ) 0 .2 1 4 ( 0 .1 6 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .9 9 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 3 .6 5 - 2 .2 4
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported. Sargan, Hansen, Dif-Hansen : tests of overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as
2df . p-values are reported. Dif-Hansen (lev) tests the validity of the 1-year lag of the rst-di¤erenced inputs as instruments in the levels equation while Dif-Hansen (L2-dif )/(L3-dif ) test the
validity of the 2-/3-year lags of the inputs as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation. m1 and m2 : tests for rst-order and second-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). Industries within R = PC-PR and R = IC-PR are ranked according to bI , industries within R = IC-EB are ranked according to bI and industries
within R = PC-MO and R = IC-MO are ranked according to (b"Nw )I .
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Table B.6: Labor economics approach: Industry-specic wage-prot elasticities and
responsiveness of wages to the alternative wage or capital intensity in R = IC-EB
Dep. var. Worker wage ln(wj(i)t)
Ind. I

"w
N
lab;ww
I

@ lnwj(i)t
@ lnwit

I

@ lnwj(i)t
@ ln(KL )it

I
Sargan Hansen
Dif-
Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
19 -0.028 (0.015) 0.417 (0.060) 0.095 (0.023) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -4.24 -2.88
8 -0.034 (0.022) 0.125 (0.036) -0.007 (0.033) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -7.85 0.82
21 -0.007 (0.024) 0.204 (0.044) -0.012 (0.026) 0.000 0.000 0.284 0.004 0.000 -7.57 -1.26
36 -0.009 (0.026) 0.090 (0.058) 0.084 (0.042) 0.000 0.414 0.331 0.701 0.498 -5.72 -1.59
45 -0.012 (0.012) 0.157 (0.047) 0.053 (0.013) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -4.62 -0.83
26 -0.001 (0.027) 0.274 (0.044) 0.020 (0.031) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 -5.84 -1.14
43 0.000 (0.014) 0.207 (0.051) 0.035 (0.021) 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.066 0.000 -4.85 -2.32
46 0.005 (0.038) 0.288 (0.054) 0.127 (0.033) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.130 0.255 -6.11 0.96
47 0.003 (0.023) 0.178 (0.065) 0.091 (0.027) 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 -5.96 -1.65
49 0.013 (0.027) 0.249 (0.042) 0.013 (0.037) 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.046 0.159 -11.66 -1.18
39 0.035 (0.031) 0.108 (0.042) 0.127 (0.032) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.001 -5.30 -1.53
48 0.019 (0.031) 0.479 (0.052) 0.079 (0.028) 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.004 -10.65 -3.81
31 0.039 (0.033) 0.065 (0.047) 0.053 (0.042) 0.000 0.001 0.141 0.410 0.244 -2.70 -1.10
5 0.022 (0.021) 0.130 (0.043) 0.106 (0.031) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.028 -8.33 -3.31
33 0.050 (0.025) 0.155 (0.032) 0.043 (0.034) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.000 -6.90 0.62
7 0.036 (0.025) 0.112 (0.038) 0.054 (0.031) 0.000 0.012 0.086 0.688 0.455 -7.76 -2.06
44 0.042 (0.019) 0.087 (0.045) 0.080 (0.025) 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.001 -7.94 -2.53
11 0.049 (0.027) 0.142 (0.041) 0.160 (0.030) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.063 -5.63 -2.29
38 0.088 (0.033) 0.254 (0.055) 0.118 (0.027) 0.000 0.168 0.607 0.480 0.932 -5.38 -2.18
34 0.064 (0.025) 0.123 (0.038) 0.042 (0.028) 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.478 0.605 -7.87 -3.07
18 0.061 (0.031) 0.146 (0.061) 0.132 (0.057) 0.000 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.000 -4.09 -1.21
29 0.040 (0.032) 0.170 (0.059) -0.007 (0.054) 0.000 0.006 0.097 0.007 0.003 -2.42 -1.09
6 0.106 (0.032) 0.179 (0.043) 0.016 (0.040) 0.000 0.005 0.189 0.030 0.002 -9.14 -4.28
52 0.109 (0.029) 0.123 (0.067) -0.013 (0.041) 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.224 0.430 -3.85 0.20
20 0.049 (0.025) 0.109 (0.040) 0.001 (0.047) 0.000 0.004 0.807 0.414 0.151 -3.90 -0.04
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Table B.6 - Continued: Labor economics approach: Industry-specic wage-prot elasticities and
responsiveness of wages to the alternative wage or capital intensity in R = IC-EB
Dep. var. Firm wage ln(wit)
Ind. I

"w
N
lab;ww
I

@ lnwj(i)t
@ lnwit

I

@ lnwj(i)t
@ ln(KL )it

I
Sargan Hansen
Dif-
Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
19 0.016 (0.070) 0.080 (0.090) 0.224 (0.063) 0.000 0.275 0.632 0.278 0.401 -2.91 -0.58
8 0.042 (0.040) -0.020 (0.040) -0.184 (0.048) 0.000 0.102 0.106 0.901 0.874 -10.45 -1.87
21 0.057 (0.067) 0.025 (0.073) -0.060 (0.045) 0.000 0.258 0.048 0.291 0.497 -6.17 -1.29
36 0.050 (0.050) -0.007 (0.050) 0.204 (0.063) 0.000 0.483 0.381 0.750 0.775 -3.46 0.72
45 0.001 (0.052) 0.052 (0.075) 0.077 (0.053) 0.000 0.852 0.526 0.897 0.877 -3.98 0.29
26 0.031 (0.050) 0.153 (0.041) 0.094 (0.061) 0.000 0.764 0.888 0.385 0.736 -6.48 -0.95
43 0.087 (0.037) -0.053 (0.078) 0.047 (0.076) 0.000 0.619 0.454 0.560 0.640 -4.80 -1.30
46 0.027 (0.061) 0.109 (0.120) 0.181 (0.072) 0.000 0.545 0.609 0.571 0.662 -2.33 1.34
47 0.047 (0.033) -0.026 (0.076) 0.082 (0.055) 0.000 0.549 0.433 0.116 0.131 -5.41 -2.24
49 0.046 (0.028) 0.010 (0.051) 0.117 (0.040) 0.000 0.349 0.857 0.412 0.726 -9.34 -1.10
39 -0.023 (0.034) -0.063 (0.062) 0.145 (0.034) 0.000 0.493 0.690 0.219 0.181 -6.73 -1.12
48 -0.001 (0.040) 0.192 (0.041) 0.050 (0.034) 0.000 0.726 0.668 0.740 0.836 -14.49 -3.70
31 0.048 (0.064) -0.045 (0.071) 0.087 (0.047) 0.000 0.002 0.028 0.119 0.014 -3.66 -0.29
5 0.055 (0.037) -0.012 (0.038) 0.125 (0.042) 0.000 0.154 0.680 0.083 0.265 -10.57 -2.99
33 0.075 (0.035) -0.031 (0.067) 0.048 (0.049) 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.339 0.068 -6.43 -0.25
7 0.095 (0.031) 0.070 (0.070) 0.100 (0.035) 0.000 0.274 0.354 0.207 0.234 -6.35 0.35
44 -0.021 (0.029) 0.029 (0.054) 0.213 (0.042) 0.000 0.027 0.022 0.668 0.458 -10.49 -1.30
11 0.038 (0.035) 0.070 (0.058) 0.064 (0.043) 0.000 0.328 0.241 0.896 0.539 -8.62 -0.26
38 0.047 (0.047) 0.007 (0.086) 0.139 (0.045) 0.000 0.416 0.621 0.391 0.281 -2.77 -0.37
34 0.027 (0.035) 0.084 (0.045) 0.020 (0.035) 0.000 0.529 0.395 0.894 0.658 -6.90 -0.57
18 0.124 (0.033) -0.060 (0.082) 0.020 (0.055) 0.000 0.751 0.886 0.658 0.889 -3.15 -0.53
29 0.047 (0.057) 0.064 (0.087) -0.014 (0.074) 0.000 0.520 0.807 0.813 0.870 -3.73 0.51
6 0.142 (0.037) 0.106 (0.062) 0.082 (0.056) 0.000 0.586 0.734 0.523 0.688 -6.77 -0.41
52 0.065 (0.053) 0.050 (0.099) 0.101 (0.050) 0.000 0.065 0.642 0.084 0.119 -4.43 -2.40
20 0.030 (0.035) 0.168 (0.071) 0.072 (0.049) 0.000 0.479 0.427 0.350 0.719 -5.63 -0.99
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported. Sargan, Hansen, Dif-Hansen : tests of
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 2df . p-values are reported. Dif-Hansen (lev) tests the validity of the 1-year lag of
the rst-di¤erenced smoothed prots-per-employee variable as instruments in the levels equation while Dif-Hansen (L2-dif)/(L3-dif) test the
validity of the 2-/3-year lags of the smoothed prots-per-employee variable as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation. m1 and m2 :
tests for rst-order and second-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1).
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Table B.7: Labor economics and accounting approach: Robustness of absolute extent of rent-sharing
parameters and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing with respect to measurement of the alternative wage
or excluding capital intensity in R = IC-EB
Absolute extent of rent sharing mean Q1 Q2 Q3
LABOR ECONOMICS APPROACH
Baseline estimates
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
I 0.099 0.001 0.079 0.201
Labor economics: elab;wwI 0.076 0.001 0.061 0.153
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
I 0.168 0.103 0.159 0.274
Labor economics: elab;fwI 0.136 0.075 0.127 0.189
Di¤erent measures of alternative wage
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
p1;I
0.070 0.001 0.106 0.203
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
p10;I
0.093 -0.022 0.036 0.184
Labor economics: elab;wwp1;I 0.080 0.047 0.069 0.099
Labor economics: elab;wwp10;I 0.071 -0.018 0.028 0.119
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
p1;I
0.167 0.096 0.162 0.269
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
p10;I
0.169 0.103 0.155 0.267
Labor economics: elab;fwp1;I 0.135 0.065 0.129 0.193
Labor economics: elab;fwp10;I 0.137 0.076 0.126 0.199
Excluding capital intensity
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
excl(K=L);I 0.133 0.010 0.144 0.237
Labor economics: elab;wwexcl(K=L);I 0.104 0.009 0.127 0.157
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
excl(K=L);I 0.253 0.165 0.230 0353
Labor economics: elab;fwexcl(K=L);I 0.206 0.125 0.181 0.287
ACCOUNTING APPROACH
Baseline computation
Accounting: median of accit 0.323 0.263 0.320 0.364
Di¤erent measures of alternative wage
Accounting: median of accp1(fw);it 0.402 0.328 0.422 0.450
Accounting: median of accp10(fw);it 0.276 0.228 0.265 0.327
Accounting: median of accp1(ww);it 0.541 0.490 0.559 0.602
Accounting: median of accp5(ww);it 0.528 0.469 0.551 0.591
Accounting: median of accp10(ww);it 0.519 0.463 0.540 0.580
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Table B.7 - Continued: Labor economics and accounting approach: Robustness of absolute extent
of rent-sharing parameters and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing with respect to
measurement of the alternative wage or excluding capital intensity in R = IC-EB
Lesters range of wages
due to rent sharing
mean Q1 Q2 Q3
LABOR ECONOMICS APPROACH
Baseline estimates
Labor economics: Llab;wwI 0.131 0.001 0.113 0.193
Labor economics: Llab;fwI 0.192 0.099 0.152 0.258
Di¤erent measures of alternative wage
Labor economics: Llab;wwp1;I 0.131 0.001 0.158 0.205
Labor economics: Llab;wwp10;I 0.114 -0.021 0.086 0.176
Labor economics: Llab;fwp1;I 0.192 0.114 0.147 0.240
Labor economics: Llab;fwp10;I 0.193 0.111 0.178 0.250
Excluding capital intensity
Labor economics: Llab;wwexcl(K=L);I 0.184 0.023 0.162 0.279
Labor economics: Llab;fwexcl(K=L);I 0.342 0.198 0.278 0.471
ACCOUNTING APPROACH
Baseline computation
Accounting: L
acc
I 1.266 0.935 1.228 1.380
Accounting: eLaccI 1.334 1.099 1.323 1.490
Di¤erent measures of alternative wage
Accounting: L
acc
p1(fw);I
1.812 1.347 1.793 1.992
Accounting: L
acc
p10(fw);I
0.989 0.765 1.004 1.182
Accounting: L
acc
p1(ww);I
3.200 2.544 3.083 3.689
Accounting: L
acc
p5(ww);I
3.044 2.300 2.962 3.357
Accounting: L
acc
p10(ww);I
2.922 2.248 2.840 3.162
Accounting: eLaccp1(fw);I 1.901 1.507 1.872 2.112
Accounting: eLaccp10(fw);I 1.042 0.848 1.045 1.199
Accounting: eLaccp1(ww);I 3.372 2.831 3.280 3.934
Accounting: eLaccp5(ww);I 3.207 2.718 3.161 3.555
Accounting: eLaccp10(ww);I 3.079 2.619 3.010 3.349
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Table B.8: Comparison of the distribution of absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters and
Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing across the three approaches in regime R 2 < = fIC-EB;PC-MO; IC-PRg
Absolute extent of rent sharing mean Q1 Q2 Q3
Regime R = IC-EB (25 ind.)
Productivity: prodI 0.293 0.225 0.291 0.355
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
I 0.099 0.001 0.079 0.201
Labor economics: elab;wwI 0.076 0.001 0.061 0.153
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
I 0.168 0.103 0.159 0.274
Labor economics: elab;fwI 0.136 0.075 0.127 0.189
Accounting: median of accit 0.323 0.263 0.320 0.364
Regime R = PC-MO (13 ind.)
Productivity: prodI -1.811 -1.137 -0.739 -0.260
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
I -0.007 -0.027 0.014 0.073
Labor economics: elab;wwI 0.010 -0.018 0.010 0.053
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
I 0.152 0.028 0.111 0.317
Labor economics: elab;fwI 0.091 0.025 0.104 0.181
Accounting: median of accit 0.253 0.206 0.247 0.294
Regime R = IC-PR (9 ind.)
Productivity: prodI 0.022 0.000 0.040 0.063
Labor economics: 
lab;ww
I -0.152 -0.075 0.031 0.158
Labor economics: elab;wwI -0.102 -0.068 0.023 0.122
Labor economics: 
lab;fw
I 0.275 0.139 0.211 0.310
Labor economics: elab;fwI 0.211 0.134 0.195 0.250
Accounting: median of accit 0.321 0.314 0.325 0.345
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Table B.8 - Continued: Comparison of the distribution of absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters and
Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing across the three approaches in regime R 2 < = fIC-EB;PC-MO; IC-PRg
Lesters range of wages
due to rent sharing
mean Q1 Q2 Q3
Regime R = IC-EB (25 ind.)
Productivity: L
prod
I 1.333 0.807 1.104 1.464
Productivity: eLprodI 1.422 0.864 1.192 1.556
Labor economics: Llab;wwI 0.131 0.001 0.113 0.193
Labor economics: Llab;fwI 0.192 0.099 0.152 0.258
Accounting: L
acc
I 1.266 0.935 1.228 1.380
Accounting: eLaccI 1.334 1.099 1.323 1.490
Regime R = PC-MO (13 ind.)
Productivity: L
prod
I -2.199 -2.920 -2.217 -1.397
Productivity: eLprodI -2.385 -3.096 -2.207 -1.584
Labor economics: Llab;wwI 0.040 -0.047 0.025 0.159
Labor economics: Llab;fwI 0.144 0.050 0.144 0.359
Accounting: L
acc
I 1.270 0.965 1.171 1.525
Accounting: eLaccI 1.350 1.067 1.265 1.562
Regime R = IC-PR (9 ind.)
Productivity: L
prod
I 0.057 0.001 0.135 0.160
Productivity: eLprodI 0.061 0.001 0.142 0.168
Labor economics: Llab;wwI -0.026 -0.082 0.032 0.219
Labor economics: Llab;fwI 0.358 0.201 0.268 0.567
Accounting: L
acc
I 1.331 1.164 1.316 1.683
Accounting: eLaccI 1.401 1.197 1.354 1.847
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Graph B.1: Labor economics approach: Robustness of absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters
with respect to measurement of the alternative wage or excluding capital intensity in R = IC-EB
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Source: Table B.7 (25 industries)
B.1a: Robustness of absolute extent of rent sharing wrt alternative wage - variant 1
phi_labww_altp1 (v1) phi_labww (v1)
phi_labww_altp10 (v1) phi_labfw_altp1 (v1)
phi_labfw (v1) phi_labfw_altp10 (v1)
-.2
0
.2
.4
Source: Table B.7 (25 industries)
B.1b: Robustness of absolute extent of rent sharing wrt alternative wage - variant 2
phi_labww_altp1 (v2) phi_labww (v2)
phi_labww_altp10 (v2) phi_labfw_altp1 (v2)
phi_labfw (v2) phi_labfw_altp10 (v2)
-.2
0
.2
.4
Source: Table B.7 (25 industries)
B.1c: Robustness of absolute extent of rent sharing wrt excluding K/L - variant 1
phi_labww (v1) phi_labww_excl(K/L) (v1)
phi_labfw (v1) phi_labfw_excl(K/L) (v1)
-.2
0
.2
.4
Source: Table B.7 (25 industries)
B.1d: Robustness of absolute extent of rent sharing wrt excluding K/L - variant 2
phi_labww (v2) phi_labww_excl(K/L) (v2)
phi_labfw (v2) phi_labfw_excl(K/L) (v2)
53
Graph B.2: Labor economics approach: Robustness of Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing
with respect to measurement of the alternative wage or excluding capital intensity in R = IC-EB
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Graph B.3: Accounting approach: Robustness of absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters
and Lesters range of wages due to rent sharing with respect to measurement of the alternative wage in R = IC-EB
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